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The idea that certain universal human rights exist arose by the 18th cen-
tury, or even earlier by some accounts.1 However, individuals’ ability to ac-
cess international institutions in order to demand the implementation of 
those rights was far from obvious, and human rights have traditionally been 
considered part of the internal affairs of a state.2 Granting individuals access 
to international institutions in order to file complaints against their own 
states was seen as a major development in international human rights law 
after World War II.3 Although there is probably no customary international 
right of individuals to access international institutions,4 some international 
and regional human rights treaties have granted individuals standing before 
international institutions. The first permanent supranational institution in 
which individuals could file communications against their countries was the 
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1. Dan Edelstein, Enlightenment Rights Talk, 86 J. MOD. HIST. 530 (2014) (discussing 
the contribution of 18th century philosophers to the development of the idea of natural rights 
and human rights).
2. Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereignty,” 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
31, 39 (1995) (discussing how the concept of state sovereignty has changed because of the 
horrors of World War II); see also KATE PARLETT, THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL SYSTEM: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 65–83 (James Crawford 
et al. eds., 2011) (arguing that, even prior to 1945, there were certain ad hoc arrangements for 
individuals to access international institutions to bring claims against states which were not 
their states of nationality).
3. PARLETT, supra note 2, at 3, 27.
4. Francesco Francioni, The Rights of Access to Justice under Customary Internation-
al Law, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE AS A HUMAN RIGHT 1, 8 (Francesco Francioni ed., 2007) (ar-
guing that there is no customary international norm granting individuals universal standing 
before international institutions).
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European Commission of Human Rights, established in 1954.5 Currently, 
there are more than 20 international courts in which individuals have stand-
ing, and even more quasi-judicial bodies.6
Even though, with time, there seems to be an increase in the number of 
international institutions granting individuals a right to access, there is a se-
rious gap in the empirical literature about the actual usage of this right. For 
instance, there is almost no empirical research on questions such as who the 
main beneficiaries of the right are in practice, what the main difficulties in-
dividuals face in accessing international justice are, and what can be done in 
order to make international institutions more accessible to people from all 
over the world.7
5. Patrick Keyzer et al., What is ‘Access to International Justice’ and What Does it 
Require?, in ACCESS TO INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1, 3 (Patrick Keyzer, Vesselin Popovski & 
Charles Sampford eds., 2015). Following the establishment of the European Commission, the
European Court of Human Rights was established in 1959. However, individuals were only 
granted direct access to it in 1998. Following the model of the European regional system, the 
American and African regions also established regional human rights systems. The Inter-
American region established the Human Rights Commission in 1959 and a Court in 1979, and 
the African region established a Commission in 1987 and a Court in 1998. In the Inter-
American Court, individuals still have standing only via the Commission, and in the African 
Court, individuals have standing only if states explicitly agree.
6. Karen J. Alter, Private Litigants and the New International Courts, 39 COMP. POL.
STUD. 22, 43 (2006).
7. Contrary to the international legal system, there is a wide literature on the subject of 
access to justice in national jurisdictions. See, e.g., Laura K. Abel, A Right to Counsel in Civil 
Cases: Lessons From Gideon v. Wainwright, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 527 (2005) 
(discussing how the vast majority of low-income people in the United States are not able to 
exercise their right to a meaningful day in court); James E. Cabral et al., Using Technology to 
Enhance Access to Justice, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 243 (2012) (assessing how technology 
improved access to justice in the United States); Mauro Cappelletti, Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution Processes Within the Framework of the World-Wide Access-to-Justice Movement, 56
MOD. L. REV. 282 (1993) (discussing alternative dispute resolution as a channel of accessing 
justice); Brian Etherington, Promises, Promises: Notes on Diversity and Access to Justice, 26 
QUEEN’S L.J. 43 (2000) (arguing that channeling litigation toward alternative dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms has in fact decreased the access to justice of diversity groups in Canada. For 
literature on access to justice in jurisdictions other than the United States and Canada, see 
Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, Access to Justice: The Newest Wave in the Worldwide 
Movement to Make Rights Effective, 27 BUFF. L. REV. 181 (1977) (discussing the emergence 
of the concept of “access to justice” and how it is interpreted in different jurisdictions); Mat-
thieu Chemin, The Impact of the Judiciary on Entrepreneurship: Evaluation of Pakistan’s
“Access to Justice Programme,” 93 J. PUB. ECON. 114 (2007) (evaluating how access to jus-
tice increased in Pakistan following a reform in the judicial system); Marc Galanter & Jayanth 
K. Krishnan, “Bread for the Poor”: Access to Justice and the Rights of the Needy in India, 55 
HASTINGS L.J. 789 (2004) (discussing access to justice of the poor in India); Patricia Hughes, 
Law Commissions and Access to Justice: What Justice Should We Be Talking About?, 46 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 773 (2008) (arguing that, in the Canadian context, law commissions 
should have a wider perspective of the “access to justice” idea and incorporate into their work 
insights of other disciplines and the experience of diverse communities); Earl Johnson, Jr.,
Equal Access to Justice: Comparing Access to Justice in the United States and Other Indus-
trial Democracies, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. S83 (2000) (conducting comparative research 
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This Article uses the individual petitions system under the First Option-
al Protocol (the “OP”)8 to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (the “ICCPR”)9 as a case study in order to shed some light on the ac-
tual practice of the right to access international justice. The United Nations 
Human Rights Committee (the “HRC”)—the treaty body responsible for 
overseeing the implementation of the ICCPR—is of special interest to re-
searchers since it is a high profile and internationally acclaimed quasi-
judicial body that can accept individual communications against 115 states. 
Although over one billion people have been under the jurisdiction of the 
HRC since 1977,10 as of March 2014, petitioners brought only 2,371 indi-
vidual communications. This single piece of data can in itself pose grave 
doubt as to the success of the idea of access to international justice in the 
context of the HRC, or at least trigger further research into this question.
This Article has two main purposes. The first is to describe and evaluate 
empirically the right of individuals to access the HRC under the OP in light 
of the special goals of this procedure as perceived by the different stake-
holders. The second is to recommend ways to improve individuals’ access 
to the HRC and thereby to international justice in general. In order to ad-
dress the first question, the Article uses a mixed-methods approach—a
combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods.
For the quantitative part of the research, I constructed an original da-
taset of the number of communications brought against different countries 
in a given year. Additionally, I coded the various political and socioeco-
nomic characteristics of those countries. This gives us a picture of who most 
often uses the individual communications mechanism and what might be the 
main obstacles to filing communications with the HRC. I also coded wheth-
er individuals were represented in different communications, who repre-
sented them (private lawyers or non-governmental organizations 
[“NGOs”]), and analyzed whether representation increases the probability 
that the HRC finds a violation in the case.
about access to justice in the United States and other industrialized jurisdictions); Matthias 
Killian, Alternatives to Public Provision: The Role of Legal Expenses Insurance in Broaden-
ing Access to Justice: The German Experience, 30 J.L. & SOC’Y 31 (2003) (describing the 
German experience of promoting access to justice); A. A. S. Zuckerman, Lord Woolf’s Access 
to Justice: Plus ça change . . ., 59 MOD. L. REV. 773 (1996) (reviewing a report by Lord 
Woolf about the problems of access to justice in the United Kingdom).
8. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (allowing individuals to file communi-
cations with the Human Rights Committee [HRC] arguing that at least one of the rights grant-
ed to them by the ICCPR has been violated by a member state) [hereinafter Optional Proto-
col].
9. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
10. Henry J. Steiner, Individual Claims in a World of Massive Violations: What Role 
for the Human Rights Committee?, in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY 
MONITORING 15–17 (Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000).
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For the qualitative part of the research, I conducted interviews with 32 
applicants, lawyers, and NGOs that brought or helped to bring communica-
tions to the HRC. The interviewees were asked questions about their experi-
ences with the process, their difficulties with it, and how they thought the 
process could be made more accessible.
I find that there is a significant global inequality in accessing the HRC, 
since communications are much more likely to be filed against democratic 
countries with high socioeconomic characteristics. There also seems to be a 
problem with awareness of the possibility of filing individual communica-
tions. Another problem with the accessibility of the system is state intimida-
tion of applicants who have filed communications to the HRC. Many proce-
dural problems also stem from the fact that the Secretariat—and the HRC 
itself—is very much underfunded. However, the system is widely perceived 
as fair, and most of the applicants would recommend filing communications 
to the HRC to others. In order to make recommendations about increasing 
the accessibility of the HRC, I use both the empirical findings of this Article 
and recommendations about increasing access to justice that have been dis-
cussed in the general literature on the subject.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides the theoretical back-
ground for the research. It introduces the concept of access to justice in the 
national and international context and explains what the HRC and the OP 
are. Part II explains the research question in detail and elaborates on the re-
search methods used in this Article. Part III constitutes the empirical part of 
the Article—both the quantitative analysis of the dataset and the analysis of 
the interviews. Finally, Part IV evaluates the success of the individual 
communications system and proposes possible reforms.
I.  Access to Justice
A. What is Access to Justice?
The discussion about individuals’ ability to access institutions in order 
to realize their legal rights started not in the international legal context, but 
rather in the national.11 The basic assumption is that having certain rights 
does not ensure the implementation of those rights, so procedural guarantees 
are also needed. It is argued that equal justice should necessarily imply 
equal access to the justice system, and that procedural justice is one of the 
11. Aristotle saw a just society as one that “empowers and enables citizens to realize 
their virtue and take what they deserve.” Patrick Keyzer et al., What is ‘Access to Justice’ and 
What does it Require?, in ACCESS TO INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1 (Patrick Keyzer et al. eds., 
2015). In more modern times, Martha Nussbaum addressed the idea that it is important to 
support the capability of people to address injustices. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,
FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 9 (2009).
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ways to attain social justice.12 Along these lines, the term “access to justice”
was originally defined as “[t]he system by which people may vindicate their 
rights and/or resolve their disputes under the general auspices of the state.”13
Access to justice is not limited to access to official courts, but rather in-
cludes a variety of legal institutions such as quasi-judicial institutions, ad-
ministrative bodies, arbitration, and even tribal courts that apply local cus-
tomary laws.14
Even though, in recent years, the main discussion in the context of ac-
cess to justice has been about the financial ability of people to bring a case 
before a court or another legal institution, the problem is not only finan-
cial.15 The term “access to justice” generally refers to the ability of an indi-
vidual to bring his case before a court and have a judicial process.16 It also 
means that the individual has a right to have his case adjudicated in a fair 
and just way.17 This Article focuses on the idea of access to justice in the 
broader sense—i.e., the evaluation of the possibility of an individual to 
bring his case before an institution and receive a fair process and a just deci-
sion that can be implemented at the national level.
Access to justice is of special importance to the weaker members of so-
ciety, since the assumption is that others can protect their interests through 
alternative economic and political measures.18 Marginalized members of so-
ciety, in contrast, lack the power and resources to guarantee their rights, and 
courts are seen as having an important role in protecting their interests.19
This is especially true for developing countries with fragile democracies and 
significant economic inequalities.20 Despite that, research conducted in vari-
12. Deborah Rhode, Access to Justice: Connecting Principles to Practice, 17 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 369, 372 (2004).
13. MARIA FEDERICA MOSCATI, THE ROLE OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND ACCESS 
TO JUSTICE IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND DEMOCRATIC ADVANCEMENT 9 (2015), http://
www.democraticprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/MOSCATI_TRANSITIONAL-
JUSTICE-Proof.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
14. THE HAGUE INST. FOR INNOVATION OF LAW, TREND REPORT/PART 1: TOWARDS 
BASIC JUSTICE CARE FOR EVERYONE 5, 8, 17 (2012) [hereinafter HIIL]; THE COMM’N ON 
LEGAL EMPOWERMENT OF THE POOR & UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAM [UNDP], 2
MAKING THE LAW WORK FOR EVERYONE 25–27, 42–53 (2008) [hereinafter COMM’N ON 
LEGAL EMPOWERMENT]; UNDP, PROGRAMMING FOR JUSTICE: ACCESS FOR ALL 60–100
(2005) [hereinafter UNDP 2005].
15. See Marc Galanter, Access to Justice in a World of Expanding Social Capability, 37 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 115 (2010).
16. Francioni, supra note 4, at 1.
17. Id.
18. UNDP 2005, supra note 14, at 23.
19. See ROSIE WAGNER, THE RULE OF LAW AND THE POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT 
AGENDA 20 (2013) (arguing that access to justice can challenge existing distributions of pow-
er and resources).
20. HIIL, supra note 14, at 28–29; see also Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Reimagining Ac-
cess to Justice in the Poor People’s Courts, 22 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 473 (2015) (dis-
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ous national jurisdictions shows that often the most vulnerable members of 
a society, who need the protection of the courts the most, are in practice the 
ones to whom the courts are least accessible.21 This situation is frequently 
referred to in the literature as the “access to justice gap[.]”22
B. Access to Justice in International Law
There is much to be written and discussed about individuals’ access to 
international courts and other institutions. However, since the methodology 
of the current research is not comparative but rather uses the HRC as a case 
study, this part will provide only a brief introduction to the subject. It will 
highlight the relevant points for understanding the general context and the 
problems that individuals might face with accessing justice in the interna-
tional sphere.
The literature suggests that individuals’ access to international judicial 
institutions is important because “private actors are more numerous and 
would appear especially likely to pursue cases that are either too politically 
‘hot’ or a low priority for international commissions or states with limited 
resources and conflicting priorities.”23 There seems to be a general agree-
ment that individual access to international institutions serves two main 
purposes.24 The first is providing the individual bringing his case to an in-
ternational institution with a remedy.25 The second is to promote change and 
develop jurisprudence on a specific subject matter.26 It is also argued that a 
judgment of an international court carries symbolic value by highlighting 
the violations and individual suffering to an international audience27 and 
cussing the importance of access to justice for the empowerment of marginalized groups in the 
national context).
21. Id. The literature suggests two barriers that might be of special significance to mar-
ginalized groups. The first barrier is language. Many times, legal procedures and information 
about legal rights are available only in the language of the majority in the country. The second 
barrier is geographical distance from courts, which can sometimes be an obstacle because it is 
burdensome and costly for individuals to come to a court to file a lawsuit and to participate in 
the procedures. See HIIL, supra note 14, at 43; UNDP 2005, supra note 14, at 19; WAGNER,
supra note 19, at 20; Martin Gramatikov, A Framework for Measuring the Costs of Paths to 
Justice, J. JURIS. 111, 118–19 (2009).
22. HIIL, supra note 14, at 45; UNDP 2005, supra note 14, at 3, 6.
23. Alter, supra note 6, at 24.
24. Lorna McGregor, The Role of Supranational Human Rights Litigation in Strength-
ening Remedies for Torture Nationally, 16 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 737, 742 (2012).
25. Freek van der Vet, Holding on to Legalism: The Politics of Russian Litigation on 
Torture and Discrimination Before the European Court of Human Rights, 23 SOC. & LEGAL 
STUD. 361, 362 (2014) [hereinafter van der Vet, Holding on to Legalism].
26. Id.; McGregor, supra note 24, at 741.
27. See Çali, The Logics of Supranational Human Rights Litigation, Official Ac-
knowledgment, and Human Rights Reform: The Southeast Turkey Cases before the European 
Court of Human Rights 1996–2006, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 311 (2010).
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serving as an anti-narrative to state violence.28 Finally, international courts 
can serve a function resembling that of truth commissions,29 or even that of 
constitutional courts.30
International institutions accessible to individuals play a part in promot-
ing the recognition and implementation of human rights and promoting 
marginalized communities.31 For instance, especially in the European con-
text, supranational litigation has helped to promote the human rights of mi-
norities, LGBT communities, and torture victims, as well as social rights.32
Also, in the context of the Inter-American system, regional institutions have 
helped promote issues such as the struggle against enforced disappearances 
and indigenous rights.33 The Inter-American system might also have played 
a part in the struggle for democratizing the region, creating a platform for 
discourse on freedom of expression and non-discrimination.34 However, as 
will be discussed further in this Article, there is a serious problem with im-
plementing the decisions of those institutions, and international institutions 
are likely to influence domestic policies only after repeated litigation on the 
subject.35
In the context of international litigation, NGOs are seen as important 
actors, and in some institutions, they even have standing in their own right, 
though the specific roles they play vary. Whereas, in the African and Inter-
American systems, NGOs are involved in a variety of cases, in the European 
system, NGOs are involved mainly in litigation against specific countries.36
28. Id.
29. Dia Anagnostou, Does European human rights law matter? Implementation and 
domestic impact of Strasbourg Court judgments on minority-related policies, 14 INT’L J.
HUM. RTS. 721 (2010).
30. Alter, supra note 6, at 22–23, 25 (arguing that international human rights courts 
usually play a role of constitutional courts for checks and balances and are better able to in-
duce state respect for international law).
31. Vivek Maru, Access to Justice and Legal Empowerment: A Review of World Bank 
Practice, 2 HAGUE J. RULE L. 259 (2010); van der Vet, Holding on to Legalism, supra note 
25, at 364; WAGNER, supra note 19, at 21.
32. Lisa Conant, Individuals, Courts, and the Development of European Social Rights,
39 COMP. POL. STUD. 76 (2006); Maru, supra note 31, at 364; McGregor, supra note 24, at 
739; van der Vet, Holding on to Legalism, supra note 25, at 321.
33. Thomas M. Antkowiak, Rights, Resources, and Rhetoric: Indigenous Peoples and 
the Inter-American Court, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 113, 125–26 (2013); Conant, supra note 32.
34. David C. Baluarte, Strategizing For Compliance: The Evolution of a Compliance 
Phase of Inter-American Court Litigation and the Strategic Imperative For Victims’ Repre-
sentatives, 27 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 263, 320 (2012); Ariel Dulitzky, Too Little, Too Late: 
The Pace of Adjudication of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 35 LOY. L.A.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 131, 131–33 (2013); see also PARLETT, supra note 2, at 3 (suggesting 
that access to justice has a potential to promote democratic processes and human develop-
ment).
35. Anagnostou, supra note 29, at 721.
36. Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, NGO Standing and Influence in Regional Human Rights 
Courts and Commissions, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 911, 913–14, 937 (2011); van Der Vet, Hold-
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In the context of the European system in particular, it is generally consid-
ered that NGOs file complaints of a higher quality than those of other liti-
gants37 and help promote marginalized groups that would not otherwise 
have had access to the international system.38 NGOs engage in litigation 
both for the benefit of the specific applicants they represent and to promote 
awareness of widespread human rights violations.39 This sort of strategic lit-
igation has raised the concern that applicants are not selected for the value 
of the process to them as individuals, but rather for their relative possible 
contribution to the goal of the litigation. As a consequence of this aim, the 
specific applicant’s needs and desired remedy are not the top priority in the 
litigation.40
One of the major obstacles to accessing international justice is the lack 
of awareness of the possibility of filing cases and the rights protected by 
human rights treaties.41 In general, it seems that private enforcement through 
international legal mechanisms remains largely a European phenomenon.42
The small number of cases filed in the African system is not representative 
of the problematic human rights situation in the region.43 It is suggested that 
this inconsistency can be attributed to illiteracy and lack of awareness of the 
existence of the mechanism.44 Whereas the African legal system has adjudi-
cated only 285 cases since its establishment in 1988,45 the European region-
al system had 64,850 pending applications in the year 2015 alone.46
ing on to Legalism, supra note 25, at 362; Freek van der Vet, Seeking Life, Finding Justice: 
Russian NGO Litigation and Chechen Disappearances Before the European Court of Human
Rights, 13 HUM. RTS. REV. 303, 304 (2012) [hereinafter van der Vet, Seeking Life, Finding 
Justice].
37. van der Vet, Holding on to Legalism, supra note 25, at 364.
38. van der Vet, Seeking Life, Finding Justice, supra note 36, at 304.
39. Id.
40. van der Vet, Holding on to Legalism, supra note 25, at 371; van der Vet, Seeking 
Life, Finding Justice, supra note 36, at 315.
41. Udeme Essien, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Eleven 
Years After, 6 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93, 106 (2000). For a discussion of lack of awareness 
as a major barrier to accessing justice in the national context, see HIIL, supra note 14, at 24–
25, 139; UNDP 2005, supra note 14, at 139; Gramatikov, supra note 21, at 118–19 (arguing 
that there is a general problem both regarding the awareness of the existence of substantial 
rights, as well as awareness of the possibility to solve the problem through a legal institution).
42. Alter, supra note 6, at 43.
43. GEORGE MUKUNDI WACHIRA, MINORITY RIGHTS GRP. INT’L, AFRICAN COURT ON 
HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS: TEN YEARS ON AND STILL NO JUSTICE 10–11 (2008); Daniel 
Abebe, Does International Human Rights Law in African Courts Make a Difference?, 56 VA.
J. INT’L L. 527, 553–54 (2016).
44. Essien, supra note 41, at 106.
45. Abebe, supra note 43, at 10.
46. Pending Applications Allocated to a Judicial Formation 31/12/2015, EUR. CT.
HUM. RTS., http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_pending_2015_BIL.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2018).
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Additionally, the different international mechanisms granting individu-
als access are not used equally by people from all relevant states. However, 
filing patterns can sometimes be explained by factors such as the population 
of the state and the human rights situation in it. For instance, in the African 
region, most of the cases are filed against eight states; some can be ex-
plained by large populations, some by internal conflicts.47 In the European 
system, as of 2015, Ukraine, Russia, and Turkey had the most cases pending 
against them.48 These are all states with large populations and problematic 
human rights records relative to the region.
Another possible obstacle to accessing international institutions is the 
requirement to exhaust domestic remedies. The idea is that states, as sover-
eigns, are responsible for implementing international human rights, and in-
ternational institutions should intervene only if states fail in correctly im-
plementing those rights.49 However, it seems that international institutions 
are quite lenient with applicants about exhaustion of domestic remedies in 
cases where it is clear that domestic institutions will not be effective or in-
dependent.50
In the national context, the need for legal representation is regarded as a 
major obstacle to accessing legal institutions.51 Some international institu-
tions are aware of the fact that this might be a problem and address it ac-
cordingly. For instance, in the European Court, the African Court, and the 
Inter-American Commission, applicants can apply for legal aid if they are 
unable to pay for representation.52 However, in the European and Inter-
47. Abebe, supra note 43, at 548.
48. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, ANALYSIS OF STATISTICS 2015, at 8
(2016), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_analysis_2015_ENG.pdf (Oct. 4, 2018).
49. ANTONIA TRINDADE, THE ACCESS OF INDIVIDUALS TO INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 
100–08 (2011); YOGESH TYAGI, THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 471 (2011).
50. Çali, supra note 27, at 320; Juan E. Méndez & José Miguel Vivanco, Disappear-
ances and the Inter-American Court: Reflections on a Litigation Experience, 13 HAMLINE L.
REV. 507, 537–38 (1990); McGregor, supra note 24, at 738–39. It should be noted that cor-
ruption in the legal system and the bureaucracy are also seen as a serious impediment for an 
individual to access a legal institution, have a fair procedure, and receive a just decision in his 
case. See HIIL, supra note 14, at 43; UNDP 2005, supra note 14, at 82.
51. UNDP, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 4, 12 (2004); UNDP 2005, supra note 14, at 139; Mark 
Findlay, Internationalised Criminal Trial and Access to Justice, 2 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 237, 
250 (2002); Gramatikov, supra note 21, at 117; WAGNER, supra note 19, at 20; see also Debo-
rah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 869 (2009) 
(discussing legal cost as a barrier to access to justice in national jurisdictions).
52. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Establish-
ment of an African Court on Human and People’s Rights art. 10, June 9, 1998, OAU Doc. 
OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT (III); European Court of Human Rights, Rules of Court,
COUNCIL EUR., r. 100–05, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Rules_Court_ENG.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2018); Inter-Am. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Rules of the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights on the Legal Assistance Fund of the Inter-American Human Rights Sys-
tem, arts. 3–4, OAS, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/fund.asp#tab1 (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2018).
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American systems, legal assistance is not granted from the beginning of the 
procedure but rather only at later stages. In the African system, legal assis-
tance is provided only for cases before the court, but not those before com-
mission.53
Finally, implementing international institutions’ decisions seems to be a 
major problem.54 In recent years, international institutions have moved away 
from issuing merely declaratory orders toward issuing more specific or-
ders.55 However, states that do not respect human rights in general are not 
likely to respect the decisions of human rights institutions.56 Unlike state 
compliance with the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (the 
“ECtHR”), state compliance with the decisions of the Inter-American Court 
and the African Commission is low. For instance, whereas around 56% of 
the European Court’s decisions are fully implemented,57 only 20% of the 
decisions of the Inter-American Court are fully implemented.58 In the Afri-
can system, it is around 14%.59 It is suggested that, in the European context, 
states tend to implement the decisions of the court because they are more 
democratic in general and not necessarily because of the way in which the 
system itself operates.60 More generally, states are more likely to implement 
decisions granting monetary compensation than decisions requiring broader 
political or legislative reforms.61 The low rate of implementation may also 
be attributable in part to the lack of clarity in decisions.62
53. Guidelines for the Submission of Communications, AFR. COMM’N HUM. &
PEOPLES’ RTS., http://www.achpr.org/files/pages/communications/guidelines/
achpr_infosheet_communications_eng.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
54. See Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expres-
sive Theory of International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229, 1315 (2004) 
(finding that compliance with judgments of the International Court of Justice is around 68%); 
see also OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, FROM JUDGMENT TO JUSTICE: IMPLEMENTING 
INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS DECISIONS 1, 119 (2010), https://
www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/from-judgment-to-justice-20101122.pdf
(last visited Oct. 4, 2018) (providing additional data on implementation of judgments in the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights).
55. McGregor, supra note 24, at 737.
56. See James L. Cavallaro & Stephanie Erin Brewer, Reevaluating Regional Human 
Rights Litigation in the Twenty-First Century: The Case of the Inter-American Court, 102 
AM. J. INT’L L. 768, 770 (2008).
57. Dia Anagnostou & Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Domestic Implementation of Human 
Rights Judgments in Europe: Legal Infrastructure and Government Effectiveness Matter, 25
EUR. J. INT’L L. 205, 215 (2014).
58. David C. Baluarte, Strategizing for Compliance: The Evolution of a Compliance 
Phase of Inter-American Court Litigation and the Strategic Imperative for Victims’ Repre-
sentatives, 27 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 263, 290 (2012).
59. Abebe, supra note 43, at 14.
60. See Cavallaro & Brewer, supra note 56, at 774–75.
61. Id. at 785; van der Vet, Seeking Life, Finding Justice, supra note 36, at 320.
62. Abebe, supra note 43, at 551; McGregor, supra note 24, at 747.
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In conclusion, it seems that potential applicants are likely to face quite 
similar difficulties accessing justice in the international context as in the na-
tional one in many regards. The most important problem, which might be 
even more acute in the international system, is the lack of awareness of the 
possibility of filing a communication with an international institution. An-
other important aspect is that the European system appears to be the most 
widely used and effective system, and its membership includes more demo-
cratic and developed countries. Finally, there seems to be a serious problem 
with implementing decisions of international institutions, which might deter 
individuals from bringing communications in the first place if their primary
goal is receiving a remedy.
C. Improving Access to Justice
Due to the significant problems with the accessibility of legal institu-
tions, some scholars proposed suggestions to improve access to justice. 
These suggestions have been proposed mainly in the context of national ju-
risdictions, but they are relevant to the international sphere as well. Since 
awareness of rights and the need for legal help are seen as the central prob-
lems for access to justice, most of the suggestions focus on them. The first 
suggestion is to broaden awareness through focused legal education, target-
ed especially at marginalized communities. This can be done using various 
methods, including community-based education, radio and television broad-
casts, as well as printed material.63 Other helpful methods for disseminating 
information are through social networks, NGOs, local bar associations, and 
the internet.64
As to the problem of overcoming the need for legal assistance, the sug-
gestions are divided into two aspects. The first aspect is simplifying legal 
procedures so that some cases can be brought without the need for profes-
sional assistance. This includes simplifying the legal procedures themselves 
as well as the necessary legal documents.65 Some of the latest developments 
in this field include computer programs that help people without legal edu-
cation to fill out legal forms.66 However, as Deborah Rhode rightfully notes, 
these developments mainly benefit the educated population,67 and many 
marginalized populations are still in need of some sort of legal assistance. 
Hence, many scholars encourage developing legal assistance through clinics 
at law schools, pro bono programs at law firms, and NGOs as the second 
63. COMM’N ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT, supra note 14, at 19, 23; Maru, supra note 
31, at 263.
64. COMM’N ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT, supra note 14, at 21.
65. Id. at 18, 36.
66. Rhode, supra note 51, at 869.
67. Id. at 883.
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aspect.68 Specifically regarding NGOs, it is suggested that it is particularly 
helpful if they bundle legal help together with other programs for assisting 
the poor.69 Finally, since most of the organizations have limited resources, 
and taking into account the access to justice gap, it is suggested that the ef-
forts should be targeted at vulnerable populations, especially rural popula-
tions and minority communities.70
It is fair to say that there is no systematic research about which of these 
interventions is the most effective, or even if they are effective at all.71
There also seems to be no clear solution that fits all countries at all times, 
and some scholars suggest that different interventions should be tailored to 
the specific legal system.72 Finally, since the resources of the state and the 
different organizations are limited, some suggest that the prioritization of 
intervention should be “demand oriented”—i.e., understanding from the 
people themselves where they have the most need for intervention in order 
to access legal institutions.73
II. The United Nations Human Rights Committee
A. General Background
The ICCPR protects people’s most basic civil and political rights. The 
rights protected by the ICCPR include the right to life, the right not to be 
tortured, freedom of speech, and the right for equal treatment before the 
law.74 Currently, 170 states have joined the Covenant.75 The HRC was estab-
lished under part IV of the ICCPR in order to monitor the implementation of 
the various rights by the State parties. The HRC consists of 18 Committee 
Members (“CMs”) elected by states which are members to the ICCPR.76
The OP grants individuals the right to bring individual communications 
68. Frank S. Bloch, Access to Justice and the Global Clinical Movement, 28 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 111 (2008) (discussing how clinics at law school can assist individuals from all 
over the world to access legal institutions); Alex J. Hurder, Nonlawyer Legal Assistance and 
Access to Justice, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2241 (1999) (discussing how non-lawyers can assist 
low income families and marginalized groups to access legal institutions).
69. COMM’N ON LEGAL EMPOWERMENT, supra note 14, at 335.
70. UNDP, supra note 51, at 10, 12; Rhode, supra note 51, at 898–99.
71. Maurits Barendrecht, Legal Aid, Accessible Courts or Legal Information? Three 
Access to Justice Strategies Compared, 11 GLOBAL JURIST 1, 1 (2011).
72. See, e.g., Richard Nash, Financing Access to Justice: Innovating Possibilities to 
Promote Access for All, 5 HAGUE J. RULE L. 96, 114 (2013).
73. Barendrecht, supra note 71, at 1, 7.
74. ICCPR, supra note 9, arts. 6, 7, 19, 26.
75. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY 
COLLECTION, at 1, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/
Chapter%20IV/IV-4.en.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
76. ICCPR, supra note 9, at Part IV.
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against member states to the HRC.77 The OP was opened for signature on 
December 16, 1966 and came into force on March 23, 1976. Currently, 116 
states are signatories to the OP.78 This makes the HRC the most universal 
international institution individuals can access to receive remedies for viola-
tions of their human rights.
Andrew Byrnes famously argued that the individual communications 
system in the HRC serves three purposes: (1) providing an effective and 
timely remedy to a person whose rights have been violated; (2) bringing law 
and practice changes in the state against which the petition was brought; and 
(3) providing guidance to other State parties on the meanings and guaran-
tees in the treaties, as well as the measures needed to implement them.79
There seems to be some disagreement between scholars as to what is the 
primary goal of the procedure under the OP.80 It might also be the case that 
different stakeholders (i.e., the states, the individuals, and the HRC) have 
different understandings of the primary goal of the individual communica-
tions procedure.
The OP itself states in the Preamble that the individual communications 
mechanism was established to “achieve the purposes of the ICCPR . . . and 
the implementation of its provisions.”81 No additional purpose for the indi-
vidual communications mechanism is mentioned in the OP. Some scholars 
have commented that State parties intentionally left the purpose of the OP 
vague.82 The travaux préparatoires of the OP might suggest that implemen-
77. Optional Protocol, supra note 8, arts. 1, 2.
78. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, at 1, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/
Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-5.en.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
79. See generally Andrew Byrnes, An Effective Complaint Procedure in the Context of 
International Human Rights Law, in THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 139, 142 (Anne F. Bayefsky ed., 2000). See generally TYAGI, supra note 49, at 5–
11 (describing the purposes, methodology, and scope of his study on the Human Rights 
Committee).
80. See generally TYAGI, supra note 49, at 115, 141, 143 (arguing that the main goal of 
the procedure is to provide a remedy in a specific case); Geir Ulfstein, Individual Complaints,
in UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES: LAW AND LEGITIMACY 73, 105 (Helen Keller & 
Geir Ulfstein eds., 2012) (arguing that the core function of a treaty body is advancing interna-
tional human rights law, as opposed to providing relief in individual cases); Martin Scheinin, 
Access to Justice Before International Human Rights Bodies: Reflections on the Practice of 
the UN Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights, in ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE AS A HUMAN RIGHT 135–52 (Francesco Francioni ed., 2007) (arguing that the main 
purpose of a treaty body is to develop jurisprudence regarding the obligations of states under 
the ICCPR [both in the respondent state and in other member states]).
81. Optional Protocol, supra note 8, pmbl.; see also Yuval Shany, The Effectiveness of 
the Human Rights Committee and the Treaty Bodies Reform, in DER STAAT IM RECHT 1307, 
1312–16 (Marten Breuer et al. eds., 2013) (discussing the history of the purpose of the Op-
tional Protocol).
82. See, e.g., Steiner, supra note 10, at 17.
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tation was meant more in a general manner (like providing general guide-
lines to states) rather than requiring dispute resolution in a specific case.83
Although the original intention of the State parties might not have been 
to provide individuals with a remedy enforceable at the national level, the 
HRC itself has been active in promoting its decisions under the OP as bind-
ing upon the State parties—not as mere recommendations. In General 
Comment 33, the HRC stated that, in its view, decisions under the OP 
should be implemented by State parties, and that the remedy for a specific 
violation is an important part of implementation.84 For instance, the HRC 
points out that article 2(3) of the ICCPR grants a remedy for a violation of a 
right protected by the Covenant, and it constantly refers to this paragraph in 
its decisions in individual communications.85 Moreover, in 1997, the HRC 
appointed a special rapporteur for the “follow-up of views” to monitor the 
compliance of states with decisions under the OP. State compliance is re-
ported in the annual report of the HRC to the General Assembly.86 Finally, 
the HRC also established a procedure for petitioners to request interim 
measures “to avoid irreparable damage to the victim of the alleged viola-
tion.”87
A final place to find additional purposes of the OP is the ICCPR itself, 
which the procedure under the OP is designed to implement. The Preamble 
of the ICCPR mentions that the “recognition of inherent dignity and of the 
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foun-
dation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” The preamble also rec-
ognizes the responsibility of states under the Charter of the United Na-
tions (the “UN”) to promote “universal respect for, and observance of, hu-
human rights and freedoms.”88 Therefore, it seems that a general purpose of 
the ICCPR is not abstract implementation of human rights, but rather the 
universality and equality of the implementation of those rights around the 
globe.
83. See Shany, The Effectiveness of the Human Rights Committee and the Treaty Bod-
ies Reform, supra note 81, at 13, 15–16.
84. See Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 33: The Obligations of State Parties 
Under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ¶ 18, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/33 (Nov. 5, 2008) [hereinafter General Comment 33].
85. See id. ¶¶ 14, 20.
86. See id. ¶¶ 15–17; Hum. Rts. Comm., Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights 
Committee, r. 101, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/3/Rev.10 (Jan. 11, 2012) [hereinafter Rules of Proce-
dure].
87. General Comment 33, supra note 84, ¶ 19; Rules of Procedure, supra note 86, r. 92.
88. ICCPR, supra note 9, pmbl.
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B. Access to Justice in the HRC
This subsection will elaborate on some of the basic aspects of access to 
justice in the HRC.89 In order for the HRC to consider a communication 
filed to it, certain admissibility requirements need to be met.90 These are the 
central requirements as set by the OP and the HRC Rules of Procedure:
(a) The communication is not anonymous;91
(b) The communication comes from an individual (or individ-
uals) subject to the jurisdiction of a State party to the OP;92
(c) The individual claims, in a substantiated manner, to be a 
victim of a violation by that State party of any of the rights 
set forth in the ICCPR;93
(d) The communication does not constitute an abuse of the 
right of submission;94
(e) The same matter is not examined under another interna-
tional procedure;95
(f) All possible domestic remedies have been exhausted.96
Upon receipt, the communication is first sent to the secretariat of the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (the “secretariat”), 
which insures that some minimum standards are met.97 After the initial 
screening, the communication is sent to the HRC Special Rapporteur on 
New Communications.98 The Special Rapporteur ensures that the communi-
cation contains all the necessary information and officially registers the 
complaint. She may also decide to adopt a decision on interim measures to 
avoid irreparable damage to the victim of the alleged violation.99 After the 
registration of the communication, the State party is usually asked to make 
submissions within six months on both the admissibility and the merits of 
the communication.100 It should be noted that the HRC decides a case only 
89. A more detailed discussion, together with more explanations, can be found in the 
relevant sections of infra Part III.
90. Optional Protocol, supra note 8, arts. 1–3, 5; see also Rules of Procedure, supra 
note 86, r. 93.
91. Optional Protocol, supra note 8, art. 3.
92. Id. art. 1.
93. Id. art. 2.
94. Id. art. 3.
95. Id. art. 5, ¶ 2(a).
96. Id. art. 5, ¶ 2(b).
97. See TYAGI, supra note 49, at 432.
98. The HRC Special Rapporteur on New Communications is a member of the Human 
Rights Committee that is elected by the Committee Members themselves for the position. See
Rules of Procedure, supra note 86, r. 95, para. 3; SUZANNE EGAN, THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS 
TREATY SYSTEM: LAW AND PROCEDURE 258 (2011).
99. See Rules of Procedure, supra note 86, r. 92.
100. See id. r. 97, para. 2.
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on the basis of the written material submitted to it and does not hold oral 
hearings.101
After the registration of a new communication, a special rapporteur is 
appointed for each communication.102 The identity of the specific rapporteur 
is not known to the public.103 The special rapporteur, with the assistance of 
the secretariat, prepares initial recommendations and eventually a draft reso-
lution for the HRC to discuss at its session. Prior to the discussion in the 
HRC, the draft is reviewed by a special Working Group on New Communi-
cations, both on the question of admissibility and on the question of mer-
its.104 The decision of the HRC in a certain communication can be one of 
four: inadmissible; admissible (in the rare cases that admissibility is decided 
separately from the merits); no violation; or violation. In case of a violation, 
the HRC also indicates the appropriate remedy for the violation.
As will be discussed further, the procedure under the OP was designed 
to be simple and straightforward in order to make the HRC accessible to in-
dividuals. However, given the low number of communications actually filed 
under the OP over the years, there seems to be a problem either with the de-
sign of the procedure or with its de facto implementation by the HRC.
III.  Research Design
A. Motivation for the Study
The ICCPR is probably the most famous—and one of the most rati-
fied—human rights treaties, and the HRC itself is the most high-profile UN 
treaty body. For that reason, it is very surprising that such a small number of 
individual communications have been filed with it over the years. It seems 
that, because of its prestige and relative independence, the HRC can poten-
tially help raise awareness of human rights problems, develop important ju-
risprudence on many subjects, and provide individuals with needed reme-
dies through the individual communications system. This is especially true 
for people from regions that do not have effective and accessible regional 
human rights systems—mainly Asia, Africa, and some former communist 
countries.105 Also, theoretically, the system should be quite accessible be-
cause there are no oral hearings and the entire process is done in writing. 
101. See Optional Protocol, supra note 8, art. 5, ¶ 1.
102. Rules of Procedure, supra note 86, r. 95, para. 3.
103. See TYAGI, supra note 49, at 434.
104. Rules of Procedure, supra note 86, r. 93–95, 100.
105. A qualitative research study conducted on the communications filed against Aus-
tralia, a country that does not have an alternative HR tribunal, found that most of the appli-
cants felt the process of filing a communication was worthwhile. See Olivia Ball, All the Way 
to the UN: Is Petitioning a UN Human-Rights Treaty Body Worthwhile?, 385–86 (Dec. 20, 
2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Monash University) (on file with the author of this Ar-
ticle).
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However, for some reason, the system does not fulfill its potential. There-
fore, this Article seeks to evaluate the success of the system, understand the 
main difficulties in accessing it, and make recommendations for improve-
ment. Moreover, since individuals are being granted standing before an in-
creasing number of international institutions, the lessons learned from the 
HRC can shed light on the general question of how to make international 
institutions more accessible.
As mentioned above, the term “access to justice” is very broad, and the 
main question is how to evaluate the success of an institution in this regard. 
Yuval Shany suggests that assessment of the success of international courts 
should start from understanding the goal that the institution aims to 
achieve.106 After understanding the goals of the institution, we can develop 
specific criteria that may assist us in evaluating the system. However, un-
derstanding the goal of a specific institution is not a simple endeavor. As 
Shany discusses, goals can be both stated and unstated,107 different stake-
holders may have different goals, and there might also be differences in 
goals among the same stakeholders.108 Therefore, the first step is to under-
stand what the different stakeholders sought to achieve by granting individ-
uals access to the HRC. This Article evaluates this question from the per-
spectives of three stakeholders—the States parties to the OP, the HRC, and 
the individual applicants.109 Whereas the goals of the OP, as perceived by 
the member states and the HRC, were discussed in Section II.a., the qualita-
tive-empirical part of the Article assesses this question from the applicants’
point of view.
B. Research Questions and Method
I use three criteria in order to evaluate access to justice in the HRC. The 
first criterion is universality and equality of access to the HRC. This criteri-
on asks which countries most of the communications come from, and spe-
106. Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based 
Approach, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 225, 227, 230 (2012) [hereinafter Shany, Assessing the Effec-
tiveness of International Courts]. It should be noted that, whereas Shany discussed mainly 
assessing the effectiveness of international courts, this paper focuses on access to justice. See
also Mauro Cappelletti et al., Access to Justice: Variations and Continuity of a World-Wide 
Movement, 46 J. COMP. & INT’L L. 664 (1992) (discussing different political and critical ap-
proaches to the concept of “access to justice” in the context of national jurisdictions).
107. Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts, supra note 106, at 242.
108. See id. at 240–42.
109. Although Shany’s proposal was developed mainly in order to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of international courts, it also suggests many important insights for evaluating the 
accessibility of other legal institutions, including quasi-judicial tribunals like the HRC. This is 
mainly because it guides us to understand the expectations of the different stakeholders from 
granting individual access to international institutions and accordingly to evaluate the success 
of the procedure. Shany himself applied the goal-based approach to the UN treaty bodies. See
Shany, The Effectiveness of the Human Rights Committee and the Treaty Bodies Reform, su-
pra note 81.
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cifically whether an “access to justice gap” exists on the international level. 
The second criterion is difficulties with accessing the HRC. This criterion 
aims to understand the main difficulties that applicants face with accessing 
the HRC—for instance, awareness of the existence of the procedure, re-
sources needed for filing a communication, and fear of state persecution. 
The third criterion is interpersonal impressions of the process. This criterion 
is more subjective than the other two and tries to understand how the pro-
cess itself is perceived from the perspective of the applicants. For instance, I 
examine whether the process is perceived as just and whether the interview-
ees recommend filing communications to others in light of their personal
experiences. The subjective experience of people with legal institutions is 
regarded to be of special importance in evaluating access to justice in legal 
systems since research shows that people’s perception of institutions as just 
is very dependent on whether they think that the procedure was fair.110
This Article uses a mixed-methods approach—both quantitative (re-
gression analysis) and qualitative (interviews). Using both methods provides 
the best understanding of access to justice in the HRC.111 As Greene and 
Carcelli argue, using a mixed research method allows the researcher to 
evaluate both “the realist objectivist, value-neutral perspective and the con-
structivist, subjectivist value-engaged perspective.”112 In this case, the quan-
titative analysis provides a general picture of the distribution of the possibil-
ity to access the HRC and can indicate whether an “access to justice gap”
exists in the international context. It can also provide indications as to what 
might be the difficulties that potential applicants face with accessing the 
HRC. Finally, it can provide some relevant data on the rate of representation 
before the HRC and the identity of the representatives.
On the other hand, the qualitative analysis allows us to understand 
much more in depth people’s difficulties in accessing the HRC since many 
110. Laura Klaming & Ivo Giesen, Access to Justice: The Quality of the Procedure 14
(TISCO Working Paper Series on Civil Law and Conflict Resolution Sys. No. 002/2008, 
2008), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1
091105 (last visited Oct. 4, 2018). Procedural justice seems to be equally important to people 
from different cultures, and procedural justice seems to be defined largely in terms of the 
same variables across cultures. See Brockner et al., Culture and Procedural Justice: The In-
fluence of Power Distance on Reactions to Voice, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 300 
(2001); See Lind et al., Procedural Context and Culture: Variation in the Antecedents of Pro-
cedural Justice Judgments, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 767 (1997); Ikuo Sugawara 
& Yuen J. Huo, Disputes in Japan: A Cross-Cultural Test of the Procedural Justice Model, 7 
SOC. JUST. RES. 129 (1994).
111. See generally JOHN W. CREWSWELL, RESEARCH DESIGN: QUALITATIVE,
QUANTITATIVE, AND MIXED METHODS APPROACHES (4th ed. 2014); Mario Luis Small, How 
to Conduct a Mixed Methods Study: Recent Trends in a Rapidly Growing Literature, 37 ANN.
REV. SOC. 57 (2011) (providing an introduction to recent trends in mixed-methods research).
112. Jennifer C. Greene & Valerie J. Caracellie, Making Paradigmatic Sense of Mixed 
Methods Practice, in HANDBOOK OF MIXED METHODS IN SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 
91, 94 (Abbas Tashakkori & Charles Teddlie eds., 1st ed., 2003).
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aspects of access to justice cannot be evaluated merely by analyzing num-
bers. Moreover, quantitative data cannot answer questions regarding the 
subjective experiences of people with the procedure. Interviews with appli-
cants can give the best understanding of the goal of the individual commu-
nications procedure from the applicants’ perspective.
There are several suggestions for how to evaluate the quality of a judi-
cial procedure, and in particular the accessibility of judicial institutions. 
This Article focuses on the criteria proposed by Gramatikov, Barendrecht, 
and Verdonschot,113 as well as by Klaming & Gissen,114 together with in-
sights from other scholars.115 As will be further elaborated in Part III, I 
adopted the indicators suggested in the context of the national courts and 
added indicators relevant to the context of international law, and the HRC in 
particular. This was done considering the specific goals of the HRC and the 
quantitative findings.
IV. Evaluating Access to Justice under the OP
A. Quantitative Analysis
In the quantitative part, I will first present and analyze data about global 
equality of access to justice, and then I will present and analyze data regard-
ing legal representation before the HRC.
1. Universality and Equality of Access to the HRC
i.  Research Question and Hypothesis
As mentioned previously, according to official UN data, only 2,371 
communications were filed until March 2014. Even though the original def-
inition of the “access to justice gap” focused on people within a country, it 
can also be a good analogy—even if not perfect—at the international level. 
Using the same rationale, it seems that the ones who need the HRC the most 
are people under the jurisdiction of countries that are the least likely to 
comply with the ICCPR. Similarly, according to previous literature, people 
from non-democratic and less socioeconomically developed countries are 
less likely to exercise their rights to access legal institutions.116 Therefore, 
the main hypothesis in this chapter is that people are more likely to file 
communications against countries that are more developed and democratic.
113. See generally Martin Gramatikov et al., Measuring the Costs and Quality of Paths 
to Justice: Contours of a Methodology, 3 HAGUE J. RULE L. 349 (2011).
114. Klaming & Giesen, supra note 110.
115. Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts, supra note 106 at 254; 
see Byrnes, supra note 79; see Scheinin, supra note 80.
116. See supra Part I.
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ii.  Data
The main dependent variable in this section is the number of communi-
cations brought against a state in a given year. I coded the number of com-
munications filed against States parties to the OP for every year in which 
they were parties (N=1,639). I collected the data from all 799 decisions is-
sued by the HRC between 1997 and 2012. The decisions were taken from 
the Bayefsky database117 and supplemented by the UN Treaty Body Data-
base (for decisions published after July 27, 2012).118 It is important to note 
that states entered the dataset only from the year that they joined the OP. 
Therefore, there are states for which not all years are coded. Additionally, as 
independent variables, I coded different geographical, political, and socio-
economic characteristics for each state in the specific year of the observa-
tion.
I chose to construct a dataset based on decisions issued between 1997–
2013 because my main concern was to understand the current patterns of 
filing communications to the HRC and what can be done to make the pro-
cess more accessible to more people from all over the world. It should be 
noted that I could know that a communication was filed in a given year only 
if there actually was a decision of the HRC on the communication (either on 
admissibility or on merits grounds). Therefore, if a communication was filed 
but eventually discontinued, or there was no decision on it at the time that I 
did the coding, it was not included in the dataset.119
In order to test the hypothesis, I use total as a dependent variable—a
count variable indicating the number of communications filed against a state 
in a given year. I use the following independent variables: human rights 
score of the country, independence of the judiciary score, freedom of speech 
score, polity score, rule of law score, GDP per capita (log), and literacy rate. 
I also control for three variables that may explain the number of communi-
cations filed. First, I control for the existence of an alternative regional hu-
man rights institution for the claim, since applicants can usually bring their 
case only before one international forum.120 Second, I control for the popula-
tion of a country, since one should expect more communications filed 
against countries with larger populations. Finally, I control for the number 
of years that passed between the given year and the year that the country 
117. The United Nations Human Rights Treaties: Jurisprudence: CCPR, 
BAYEFSKY.COM, http://www.bayefsky.com/docs.php/area/jurisprudence/treaty/ccpr/opt/0/
node/5/type/all (last visited Oct. 4, 2018). The project of collecting the communication was 
initiated, supervised, and created by Professor Anne Bayefsky of the Touro College.
118. Treaty Bodies Search, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER,
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2018).
119. I tried to receive information about discontinued communications from the secretar-
iat, but I was told that they do not have it.
120. See Laurence R. Helfer, Forum Shopping for Human Rights, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
285 (1999).
Fall 2018] Access to Justice 473
first joined the OP, since people might become more aware of the possibil-
ity of filing a communication over time.121
iii.  Results
The first step is to provide descriptive statistics. The regional distribu-
tion of membership in the OP is as follows: 29.57% of the states belong to 
the African group, 10.43% to the Asian group, 19.13% to the Eastern Euro-
pean group, 20.87% to the Latin American group, and 20% to the Western
group. When we look at the distribution of the number of communications 
on the regional level, we see the following distribution: 8.47% of the com-
munications were filed against African countries, and the same percentage 
of communications were filed against Latin American countries. 16.04% of 
the communications were brought against Asian countries, 22.15% against 
Eastern European countries, and 44.28% against Western countries.
Since the Western group, in general, is regarded as having a better hu-
man rights record than other regions, this may indicate that more communi-
cations are not necessarily filed against worse human rights violators. This 
is even more evident when we compare the percentage of states from the 
region parties to the OP with the percentage of communications filed 
against states in the region:
Figure 1—Percentage of States Members to the OP and 
Percentage of Communications
When we look at the distribution on the state level, the state against 
which most of the communications were filed in the time period of the re-
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search was Spain: 92 communications. Spain is followed by Belarus (54), 
Canada (51), Australia (44), and the Czech Republic (42). During the rele-
vant time period, no communications were filed against one-third of the 
countries examined. Among the countries against which no communications 
were filed are Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, and Malta, as well as countries 
such as Bolivia, Albania, Chad, Ghana, and Congo.122
The next step is to test the hypothesis in a regression that allows us to
control for population, existence of an alternative tribunal, and years since 
joining the OP. I use a negative binomial regression model. The negative 
binomial model is more appropriate in this case than the Poisson model that 
is often used for count models because the Poisson distribution assumes that 
the mean and variance of the dependent variable are equal. In the data pre-
sented in this Article, however, the mean of the dependent variable total is 
0.47 and the variance is 2.11. Moreover, in a goodness-of-fit test for the 
Poisson model, the chi-squared value was > 0.000, allowing us to reject the 
null hypothesis that the Poisson model is the appropriate one. Finally, the 
standard errors were clustered for the different states in all the specifica-
tions.
The dependent variable is the number of communications filed against a 
state in a given year. Each regression model uses different independent vari-
ables that represent the political and socioeconomic situation in a state. 
Many independent variables could not be included in the same regression 
due to multicollinearity problems; therefore, I use different independent var-
iables interchangeably.
Table 1—Negative Binomial Regression















122. See infra Appendix 2.
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Alternative -1.320*** -1.338*** -1.218*** -1.267*** -1.343*** -1.453*** -0.857***
(0.348) (0.324) (0.311) (0.317) (0.361) (0.317) (0.281)
Population 
(log)
0.546*** 0.523*** 0.559*** 0.667*** 0.555*** 0.527*** 0.553***
(0.0905) (0.111) (0.102) (0.117) (0.0949) (0.0887) (0.0924)
Delta year -0.0921*** -0.110*** -0.108*** -0.112*** -0.102*** -0.126*** -0.107***
(0.0174) (0.0207) (0.0170) (0.0220) (0.0207) (0.0203) (0.0214)
Constant -8.390*** -7.561*** -8.260*** -10.07*** -8.086*** -12.26*** -12.16***
(1.611) (1.829) (1.779) (1.955) (1.599) (1.902) (1.828)
Observations 1,598 1,444 1,599 1,627 1,639 1,557 1,639
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
From the models above, we can see that all the coefficients of the varia-
bles that measure the political and human rights situation in the country are 
positive, and the variables of human rights, rule of law, and judicial inde-
pendence are statistically significant. The coefficients of the GDP and the 
literacy variables are also positive and statistically significant. This indicates 
that people from more socioeconomically developed countries are more 
likely to file communications. As expected, the coefficient of population is 
positive and statistically significant. Also, the coefficient indicating the ex-
istence of an alternative regional human rights tribunal is negative and sta-
tistically significant. Potential applicants probably prefer to bring their cases 
before regional tribunals rather than the HRC because their decisions are 
more likely to be enforced. Finally, the coefficient of delta year, which indi-
cates the number of years since the state joined the OP, is negative and sta-
tistically significant. This is a surprising finding since one might assume 
that, with time, the awareness of the existence of a tribunal will be higher 
and people will be more likely to file communications with the tribunal. A 
possible explanation for this puzzle might be the fact that almost one quarter 
of the communications filed to the HRC are from the Eastern European 
group, which are countries that belonged to the communist bloc. These 
countries joined the OP only in the nineties, and perhaps this is the reason 
why the coefficient is negative. A more pessimistic interpretation might be 
that potential applicants are discouraged by the lack of state implementation 
of previous communications and, therefore, there are fewer communications 
filed.
It is also important to look into the question of whether the general pat-
tern is different when we look into the data only in specific regions or in 
narrower time frames. Therefore, I ran two additional sets of regressions: by 
UN regional group and by time frame.123 As for the regional regressions, it 
seems that the general patterns described above continued to exist, but the 
coefficients of polity, freedom of speech, and rule of law were much less 
123. See infra Appendices 3–4.
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statistically significant. Therefore, the “access to justice gap” probably ex-
ists more on the macro-level and is less sensitive to smaller differences 
within regions.
In addition, there were some interesting trends within the regions them-
selves. First, in the African region, the coefficients of freedom of speech 
and human rights score were negative, and the first coefficient even reached 
statistical significance. This means that, in the African context, more com-
munications are actually filed against countries with worse human rights 
and political scores. This is an interesting deviation from the very clear pat-
tern seen on the macro-level, where communications are filed against the 
more democratic countries. Also, the literacy coefficient reached positive 
statistical significance only in the less economically developed regions: Af-
rica, Asia, and Latin America. In the Eastern European and Western re-
gions, it did not reach statistical significance, and it was even negative in the 
Western group of countries.
As for the time trends, I looked into three time frames of five years 
each: 1997–2002, 2002–2007, and 2007–2012. When divided into different 
time frames, the access to justice gap seemed to follow the general trend 
with a few interesting exceptions. First, the coefficients on polity and free-
dom of speech were positive in all time periods, but reached statistical sig-
nificance only in 1997–2002. All other political and socioeconomic coeffi-
cients (human rights score, rule of law, literacy, and GDP) were positive 
and statistically significant through all time periods. However, the coeffi-
cient of delta year was both negative and statistically significant only in 
2007–2012.
I also tried to see whether a change in the human rights score of the 
state influenced the number of communications filed against it. For that 
purpose, I tested whether the difference in the human rights score of the 
state in a given year and the human rights score of the state in the year be-
fore that rendered any results. The results were not statistically significant.
In conclusion, the results indicate that there was a clear pattern of peo-
ple from countries with a good record of human rights, political freedom, 
and economic development bringing communications to the HRC. Howev-
er, those trends were much more evident on the macro-international level 
than on the micro-regional level.
2. Representation Before the HRC
As discussed above, a very important aspect of access to justice is 
whether people need legal representation in order to bring their case before 
the HRC. This is of special importance in the context of the HRC because, 
unlike some of the regional human rights systems, the HRC does not have a 
litigation fund. In order to assess that, I looked through the relevant deci-
sions and coded whether the applicant was represented. If he was represent-
ed, I also coded by whom the applicant was represented. For the cases dur-
ing the relevant time period, most of the petitioners (58.04%) were 
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represented either by an NGO (10.21%) or by a private attorney (46.71%).124
However, in 41.96% of the communications, there was no mention of the 
applicant being represented.
Figure 2
The next question is whether the fact that an applicant is represented 
improves his chances of winning a case—meaning that the HRC will find 
the communication admissible and that the state violated at least one of the 
treaty articles. The following chart demonstrates the number of applicants 
who won a case against a state and whether they were represented.
124. 1.13% were classified as other—mainly people whose family members filed peti-
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Figure 3
As can be seen from the chart, 51.9% of the applicants who were repre-
sented won their case before the HRC, compared to 48.9% of the applicants 
who were not represented. This difference is, of course, not statistically sig-
nificant,125 meaning that, according to these statistics, the HRC is a friendly 
forum for people who are not represented and, theoretically, the need for 
representation is not necessarily a significant barrier in this regard. Howev-
er, it should be considered that representation can be important to an indi-
vidual’s awareness of the possibility of filing a communication with the 
HRC.
3. Conclusion of the Quantitative Part
This part looked into two criteria: the global equality of access to justice 
and the quantitative data of representation before the HRC. On the criteria 
of equality of access to the HRC, the results indicate that, on the macro lev-
el, there is a clear pattern of people from countries with a good record of 
human rights, political freedom, and economic development bringing com-
munications to the HRC. Regarding legal representation, the descriptive sta-
tistics seem to indicate that many people filed communications in the HRC 
without being officially represented and that the lack of representation did 
not influence the chances of the HRC voting in favor of the applicant.
The quantitative part might also suggest the difficulties potential appli-
cants face, which will be further explored in the interviews. Given that there 
are certain barriers that applicants from less democratic and socioeconomi-
cally developed countries are more likely to encounter, we can hypothesize 
the different reasons for having significantly fewer communications from 
those countries. The first possible difficulty is state intimidation for filing 
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communications to the HRC. States that generally violate human rights 
probably look less favorably on communications filed against them and may 
not hesitate to take measures to prevent potential applicants from shaming 
them internationally. It is also likely harder to be aware of the procedure of 
individual communications in less democratic countries. This is because it is 
less likely to be taught in universities, the press is less likely to report about 
decisions against the state, and perhaps people have less access to infor-
mation in general.
Another interesting (though expected) finding is that the existence of an 
alternative tribunal reduces the probability of filing a communication to the 
HRC. Therefore, through the interviews, it is important to understand what 
brought applicants who chose the HRC over an alternative tribunal to do so. 
This can shed light on the relative accessibility of the HRC as compared to 
other international institutions and perhaps also provide additional indica-
tions about the different motivations for filing communications with the 
HRC.
Finally, although it seems that the HRC is quite accessible even without 
legal representation, a closer look is needed. This is because the data that I 
collected relied only on what was indicated in the decisions of the HRC. 
However, if an applicant was actually assisted by a lawyer behind the 
scenes, this would not be reflected in the data that I brought.
B. Qualitative Analysis
1. Research Questions
Interviews can assist us in answering questions regarding the motiva-
tions of individual applicants for filing individual communications with the 
HRC, the difficulties in accessing the HRC, and the interpersonal (subjec-
tive) impressions from the process. Taking into account the quantitative 
findings, I looked at the following indicators of access to justice. The corre-
sponding question numbers in the questionnaire are in parentheses. The 
questionnaire can be found in Appendix 5):126
(1)  Goal of Filing Communications to the HRC:
a. Did applicants file a communication because they hoped to 
receive a remedy or because they wanted to raise national/
international awareness of a certain problem? (Question 6)
b. Did the interviewee believe that the state would implement 
the decision? (Question 7)
126. See infra Appendix 5.
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c. How important were different aspects of the communica-
tion process to the applicants and their representatives? 
(Questions 38–42)
(2)  Difficulties with Accessing the HRC:
a. Availability of information regarding the possibility of fil-
ing a communication to the HRC—how did the applicants 
and their representatives find out about the possibility of 
filing a communication under the OP? (Questions 2, 16–
17)
b. Reasons for choosing the HRC over an alternative tribunal. 
(Questions 8–10)
c. Methods of filing communications—how did the individual 
bring the communication to the HRC? Is the process of bring-
ing communications easy and straightforward? (Question 26)
d. Requirement to exhaust domestic remedies—did applicants ex-
haust domestic remedies before bringing a communication to 
the HRC? Do states argue that the HRC lacks jurisdiction on 
these grounds? (Questions 3–5)
e. Money and other resources needed for the process—how nec-
essary is it to have legal representation? How expensive is it to 
file a communication with the HRC? How many hours of prep-
aration are needed to file a communication? Can an individual 
file a communication without professional help? (Questions 15, 
19)
f. Persecution by the state—do applicants and their representa-
tives fear persecution by the state? Did the applicants or their 
representatives actually experience persecution? (Questions 
21–25)
g. Quality of remedy—is the remedy provided by the HRC de-
tailed enough? (Question 31)
h. Hardship in implementing the decision on the domestic level—
was the decision of the HRC implemented by the state? Did the 
applicant have to undergo additional national judicial or admin-
istrative procedures in order for the HRC decision to be im-
plemented by the state? (Questions 35–36)
i. Other difficulties and concerns raised by the interviewees. 
(Questions 27, 32)
(3) Interpersonal (Subjective) Impressions from the Process:
a. Communication with the UN staff during the process it-
self—how accessible and responsive is the UN staff to ap-
plicants and their representatives? (Question 33)
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b. Fairness of the system—is the process before the HRC 
perceived as fair? (Question 34)
c. Recommending that others bring a communication—do 
applicants recommend that others use the individual com-
munication system under the ICCPR? (Question 44)
d. Willingness to file another communication—would the ap-
plicants and their representatives consider submitting an-
other communication to the HRC in the future? (Question 
46)
e. Belief in the wider effect of the decision—do the appli-
cants believe that the decision of the HRC in their case had 
a wider impact? (Question 37)
2. Data
The qualitative component of the research analyzes interviews with 
people who filed and assisted with filing communications to the HRC. I in-
terviewed applicants, private lawyers, and NGOs. I used a semi-structured 
interview method: the interviewees were asked both pre-determined ques-
tions found in a questionnaire and additional questions about relevant topics 
that came up during the interview.127 There were separate questionnaires for 
applicants and representatives, but most of the questions overlapped.128
Overall, 32 people were interviewed via Skype—four applicants, 16 private 
lawyers, and 12 NGOs.
The main method of finding the interviewees was through a search on 
the internet of the names indicated on the decision of the HRC. I contacted 
potential interviewees from decisions given between November 30, 2006 to 
February 28, 2016. Since it is much harder to locate people via the internet 
in certain countries, four of the interviewees were referred to me by other 
interviewees (a partial snowball sample).129 The interviews were conducted 
by me both in English and in Russian.
The sample of interviewees might be biased for three main reasons. 
First, I could not locate the contact details of many applicants or their repre-
sentatives, and it could be assumed that people from less developed coun-
tries are harder to locate via the internet. Another sample bias, which poses 
a problem in most interview research, is that the decision to participate in 
127. University of Chicago IRB approval IRB15-1518.
128. See infra Appendix 5.
129. See generally Mark S. Handcock & Krista J. Gile, Comment: On the Concept of 
Snowball Sampling, 41 SOC. METHODOLOGY 367 (2011); Douglas D. Heckathorn, Comment: 
Snowball Versus Respondent-Driven Sampling, 41 SOC. METHODOLOGY 355 (2011).
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the study was voluntary. Therefore, perhaps certain types of interviewees 
were more likely to agree to participate—for instance, people who were 
very disappointed with the decision of the HRC, or people who received 
precedential decisions in their favor and wanted to talk about their success. 
Also, it should be taken into account that I was able to interview only peo-
ple speaking English or Russian. This might have caused a certain bias by 
only highlighting the points of view of people who are proficient in Eng-
lish—who tend to be more educated or come from English-speaking coun-
tries—or people from the former communist countries—who are more like-
ly to speak Russian and might have quite specific human rights issues in 
their countries. Finally, another problem with the sample of interviewees is 
that I only interviewed people who actually filed a communication to the 
HRC. Therefore, I might not be able to understand some of the reasons that 
preclude people from filing communications in the first place. I tried to par-
tially solve this problem by discussing with interviewees (especially lawyers 
and NGOs) the general question of what can be done in order to make the 
HRC more accessible. Many of them had long experience promoting human 
rights, so they could shed some light on possible difficulties that preclude 
people from accessing the HRC in the first place.
3. Results
i.  Motivation for Filing Communications
As mentioned at the beginning of the Article, in order to evaluate a ju-
dicial or quasi-judicial body, one needs to understand the goal of the institu-
tion. This goal should be analyzed from the perspective of all relevant 
stakeholders—in this case, the member states, the HRC, and the applicants 
themselves. Interviews are the best tool in order to understand the goals of 
the applicants.
When asked about the reason for bringing a communication to the 
HRC,130 75% of the interviewees mentioned the belief that the state would 
implement the decision of the HRC as the motivation for bringing the com-
munication before the HRC in the first place. While 34.3% of the interview-
ees mentioned it as the primary motivation for bringing a communication, 
40.6% of the interviewees mentioned it as one of the motivations for bring-
ing a communication. On the other hand, 59.3% of the interviewees men-
tioned the will to bring the human rights violation to the attention of the na-
tional/international public as a reason for filing the communication, and 
only 18.7% of the interviewees indicated it as the only reason for bringing 
the communication to the HRC.
When asked whether they believed that the state would actually imple-
ment the decision of the HRC,131 77.4% of the interviewees did believe, to 
130. See infra Appendix 5, p. 72, question 6.
131. See infra Appendix 5, p. 72, question 7.
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some extent, that the state would eventually implement the decision of the 
HRC. However, when asked whether they were aware of the implementa-
tion rate of the decisions of the HRC,132 only 41.3% of the interviewees an-
swered that they were aware of the implementation rate.
The answers to questions 38–42 also seem to reflect a certain prefer-
ence for states implementing decisions by the HRC over other aspects of the 
process. The interviewees were asked to grade, on a scale of 1 to 5, how im-
portant several aspects of the process were for them. When asked how im-
portant it was for the applicant that the state implement the decision,133 80%
of the interviewees indicated “5[.]”134 In a parallel question,135 when the rep-
resentatives were asked how important it was for them that the decision 
would be implemented by the state, 67.85% of the interviewees indicated 
“5[.]”136 When asked how important it was that the national/international 
public be aware of the filing of the communication,137 only 36.6% of people 
indicated “5” from the point of view of the applicants,138 and 35.71% indi-
cated “5” from their personal point of view as representatives.139 Finally,
very similar numbers emerged when interviewees were asked how im-
portant it was to them that the national/international public be aware of the 
decision of the HRC in response to the communication:140 40.74% of the in-
terviewees (both applicants and representatives) indicated “5[.]”141 There-
fore, it seems that, at least from the analysis of the numerical answers, there 
is a certain preference for the HRC providing a remedy that can be imple-
mented on the national level.
Throughout the answers to different questions in the interviews, a more 
complex picture emerged. It seems that, among the interviewees, there were 
different perceptions of the role of the decisions under the OP. Some 
thought that the role of the decisions was mainly creating unified and clear
international human rights jurisprudence and awareness of human rights 
problems142 and not necessarily providing a remedy in a specific case. Oth-
ers obviously held the opposite view. Also, as reflected in the slight differ-
ence in the answers to questions 38–43, there was a difference between the 
motivations of the representatives and the motivations of the applicants 
themselves. It seems that, to some degree, the applicants tend to be more in-
132. See infra Appendix 5, p. 74, question 28.
133. See infra Appendix 5, p. 75, question 39.
134. Average—4.5.
135. See infra Appendix 5, p. 75, question 38.
136. Average—4.4.
137. See infra Appendix 5, p. 75, questions 40–41.
138. Average—3.2.
139. Average—3.7.
140. See infra Appendix 5, p. 75, questions 42–43.
141. Average—3.53 for applicants and 3.8 for representatives.
142. Interviewee ## 1, 15.
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terested in the implementation of the decision in their cases, while the repre-
sentatives (especially NGOs) at times use the cases to develop international 
jurisprudence. Representatives sometimes mentioned goals such as “strate-
gic litigation” and promoting jurisprudence on subjects like the death penal-
ty and social and economic rights.143 One of the interviewees, an experi-
enced human rights lawyer, said that:
[F]irst what we engaged in was sort of strategic litigation, and by 
that what I mean is we are trying to actually change something be-
yond just getting a remedy for the victims. I mean getting a remedy 
for the victims is foremost priority for us, but we also try to shape 
the norms and try to push some jurisprudence. One of the things we 
wanted to do with the Human Rights Committee is sort of expand 
their jurisprudence when it comes to certain aspects of social 
rights.144
Interviewees from countries with a problematic human rights record 
were many times more realistic about the prospect of implementation by the 
state.145 One interviewee revealed that “many applicants know that the deci-
sion will not change the reality.” Some mentioned that they hope that if 
there were to be more and more decisions against the state on the same sub-
ject, it would eventually have a certain impact.146 One of the interviewees 
even mentioned that the decisions of the HRC might help establish a demo-
cratic regime in his country in the future.147 He also stated that he printed a 
booklet with a summary of the decisions of the HRC against the state and 
handed it to state officials. Another interviewee mentioned that the HRC 
gives people hope against corrupt national legal institutions.148 Additionally, 
some interviewees mentioned that they brought their communications be-
cause they wanted their human rights violations to be recorded as “part of 
history” in the “United Nations official records.”149
Interestingly, there is no indication that a historic record of atrocities 
was regarded as one of the goals of the individual communications process 
by the member states (or even the HRC itself). However, interviewees from 
countries where violations of human rights are common saw it as a very im-
portant goal. Additionally, it was suggested that the decisions of the HRC 
might empower marginalized communities.150 Finally, two of the interview-
143. Interviewee ## 5, 11, 12, 22, 24, 26, 27.
144. Interviewee # 27.
145. Interviewee # 7.
146. Interviewee ## 24, 26.
147. Interviewee # 23.
148. Interviewee # 28.
149. Interviewee ## 12, 15, 20, 24.
150. Interviewee # 29.
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ees mentioned that they used the process under the OP in order to promote a 
dialogue with the state and reach a final settlement over a disputed issue.151
From the analysis above, it can be concluded that, although the original 
goal of the member states was creating non-binding jurisprudence on the 
rights granted by the ICCPR, both the HRC and the applicants themselves 
increasingly see the individual communications procedure as judicial in na-
ture, granting a remedy that should be implemented on the national level. 
Also, whereas human rights lawyers and NGOs see the HRC as a platform 
for strategic litigation, some applicants also see it as a forum to tell their sto-
ry.
ii.  Difficulties with Accessing the HRC
One of the major problems with accessing the HRC is probably the 
availability of information about filing a communication. When asked about 
how they learned about the possibility of filing communications to the 
HRC,152 the most common answer was legal education—45% of the inter-
viewees chose that option. 9% of interviewees were informed about the pos-
sibility of filing by a lawyer, and the same percentage was informed about 
the possibility of filing by an NGO. Other ways of finding out included a 
search on the internet and learning from someone else who filed a commu-
nication. Another option, which was mentioned by four interviewees, was 
courses and seminars organized by different funds to empower and promote 
human rights activities in countries with problematic human rights rec-
ords.153 The impression was that, whereas interviewees from democratic 
countries were more likely to learn about the possibility of filing a commu-
nication through university education or a search on the internet, other in-
terviewees were more likely to find out about the possibility through net-
works and seminars. All of the people interviewed who filed 
communications without legal help had either legal education or a long his-
tory of being human rights activists. Therefore, when one of my interview-
ees told me that he heard of some “lay people” who filed communications 
without professional help, I asked how he thought that they had found out 
about the possibility. I received the following answer:154
I guess it depends. In general, as you know, it’s very unexploited 
and unknown, but sometimes I guess they see in the newspaper, for 
instance.
. . .
151. Interviewee ## 17, 20.
152. See infra Appendix 5, p. 72, question 2.
153. Interviewee, ## 2, 23, 24, 28.
154. Interviewee # 29.
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Sometimes national press do talk about it and disseminate news 
about that, so they see “International expert body . . . Anti-torture 
body . . . ” or whatever condemns [a country] for torture in this 
case. I guess they also learn about it because they know someone 
that did it. It’s true, it’s not very easy, so it’s not an accessible pro-
cedure let’s say. It’s not very accessible.
When asked whether they had heard of the HRC prior to the decision to 
file a communication to the HRC themselves,155 87% of the interviewees 
mentioned that they knew about the HRC beforehand. Moreover, 68% of 
the interviewees mentioned that they had a chance to discuss and consult 
with other applicants before filing a communication themselves.156 When 
asked to provide information about interactions with others before filing a 
communication, interviewees mentioned consulting with human rights law-
yers and NGOs about the procedure and strategies of filing communications 
to the HRC.157 Also, several interviewees mentioned that they were exposed 
to the possibility of filing a communication through networks of lawyers 
and NGOs working to promote jurisprudence on a certain subject or to im-
prove the human rights situation in a certain country. These networks were 
also mentioned as good platforms for finding out more information about 
how exactly the process before the HRC works.158
Furthermore, from the interviews, it seems that some NGOs have taken 
the initiative to make the treaty mechanism much better known. For in-
stance, a handbook published by the World Organization Against Torture 
provides information about the UN individual communications system.159
This handbook has been published in five languages: English, Spanish, 
French, Arabic, and Russian. One of the interviewees who works for a big 
NGO mentioned a special project that the NGO is leading to promote capac-
ity building in litigation before the UN treaty bodies. This project involves 
155. See infra Appendix 5, p. 73, question 16.
156. See infra Appendix 5, p. 73, question 17.
157. Interviewee ## 1, 4, 5, 6, 8, 12, 13, 16, 18, 19, 20.
158. Interviewee ## 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 18, 24, 29.
159. SARAH JOSEPH ET AL., SEEKING REMEDIES FOR TORTURE VICTIMS: A HANDBOOK 
ON THE INDIVIDUAL COMPLAINTS PROCEDURES OF THE UN (2d ed. 2014), http://
www.omct.org/files/2014/11/22956/v4_web_onusien_en_omc14.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 
2018); see also Forma Zhaloby, TSENTR STRATEGICHESKOY TYAZHBY [CTR. FOR STRATEGIC 
LITIG.], http://litigation.by/komitet-oon-po-pravam-cheloveka/zhaloba-v-komitet-oon-po-
pravam-cheloveka/forma-zhaloby (last visited Oct. 4, 2018) (explaining how to file a commu-
nication to the HRC in Russian); Individual Complaints to the Human Rights Committee,
Claiming Hum. Rts., http://www.claiminghumanrights.org/ccpr_individual_communications.
html (last visited Oct. 4, 2018) (for applicants from African countries); Human Rights Com-
mittee: Communication Procedure, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR’S GUIDE TO INT’L HUM. RTS.
SYS., http://co-guide.info/mechanism/human-rights-committee-communication-procedure
(last visited Oct. 4, 2018); Human Rights Committee: Individual Complaints, INT’L JUST.
RESOURCE CTR., http://www.ijrcenter.org/un-treaty-bodies/human-rights-committee/
#Individual_Complaints (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
Fall 2018] Access to Justice 487
the NGO itself litigating precedential cases before the HRC on certain sub-
jects and then informing other NGOs about the new jurisprudence on the 
subject and helping them litigate similar cases.160
If a person or his representative is already aware of the possibility of fil-
ing a communication to the HRC, it seems that the process is somewhat 
more accessible. On the website of the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, there is a special section dedicated to the HRC.161 This sec-
tion includes explanations of the process of filing communications in lan-
guage that is supposed to be understandable to people without a legal educa-
tion. On the main page of the HRC webpage, it is even possible to find a 
model complaint with a checklist of required supporting documents. How-
ever, some interviewees mentioned that the online explanation about how to 
file a communication should be much more detailed and that a person with-
out a legal education might have trouble understanding it.162
The HRC webpage also has a section with its recent jurisprudence,163
but the ability to search by treaty article or by subject was added only re-
cently. Before that, the relevant jurisprudence was not very accessible even 
to lawyers. It should be noted that there are several websites not officially 
associated with the UN that have better options for searching for the rele-
vant jurisprudence.164 Two interviewees indeed raised the problem that the 
jurisprudence of the HRC is not very accessible through the website, and it 
is hard to conduct proper legal research before filing a communication.165
Another important question that might help shed light on the accessibil-
ity of the HRC is whether an alternative tribunal is available for the claim, 
and if so, what was the reason for bringing the communication specifically 
to the HRC? When asked whether they believed that an alternative interna-
tional human rights tribunal existed for their claim,166 41% of the interview-
ees answered in the affirmative. Half of those interviewees said that this al-
ternative tribunal was the European Court of Human Rights (the “ECtHR”). 
The interviewees were also asked why they preferred the HRC over the al-
160. Interviewee # 26.
161. Human Rights Committee: Monitoring Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS 
HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/
CCPRIndex.aspx (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
162. Interviewee ## 9, 10, 12, 15, 22.
163. Jurisprudence, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER, http://
juris.ohchr.org/en (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
164. The United Nations Human Rights Treaties, BAYEFSKY.COM, http://www.bayefsky.
com/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2018); UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), REFWORLD, http://
www.refworld.org/publisher,HRC,CASELAW,,,,0.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2018); Individual 
Communications, CTR. FOR CIV. & POL. RTS., http://ccprcentre.org/database-decisions/ (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2018).
165. Interviewee ## 9, 18.
166. See infra Appendix 5, pp. 72–73, question 8–9.
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ternative tribunal,167 and the answers were very diverse. The reasons for 
choosing the HRC over the alternative tribunals can mainly be divided into 
two: procedural reasons and reputational reasons. The procedural reasons 
mentioned were that the HRC was more efficient than the alternative tribu-
nal,168 it was easier to file a communication there,169 the process cost less 
money,170 it was easier to go through the preliminary screening of admissi-
bility,171 the HRC was more likely to grant interim measures quickly,172 the 
HRC had more flexible time frames to file communications,173 and the ap-
plicants were more knowledgeable regarding the procedures before the 
HRC than before the alternative tribunal.174 The reputational reasons for fil-
ing a communication include: the HRC was more high profile than the al-
ternative tribunal,175 the HRC was more authoritative and had a stronger 
mandate,176 the HRC was more open to hearing low-key cases,177 and the de-
cisions of the HRC were more credible.178 Finally, one of the interviewees 
mentioned choosing the HRC because it was part of the UN system.179
It seems that the process of filing a communication is quite simple. Ac-
cording to the website of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the 
communication can be sent in one of three ways: via email, regular mail, or 
fax (the latter especially for urgent matters).180 When asked about the meth-
od of filing a communication to the HRC,181 there seemed to be no special 
preference for either method: one-third of the interviewees indicated that 
they filed the communication only via email, and one-third mentioned filing 
only via regular mail. 23% said that they filed both by email and by regular 
mail, and the rest indicated that they filed via fax. Several interviewees ex-
pressed a concern that their countries had (or could have) interfered with 
regular mail that they wanted to send to the HRC.182 One interviewee even 
167. See infra Appendix 5, p. 73, question 10.
168. Interviewee ## 6, 13, 21, 29.
169. Interviewee ## 4, 6, 29.
170. Interviewee ## 4, 29.
171. Interviewee # 10.
172. Interviewee # 19.
173. Interviewee # 8.
174. Interviewee # 16.
175. Interviewee # 16.
176. Interviewee ## 20, 27, 32.
177. Interviewee # 10.
178. Interviewee # 11.
179. Interviewee # 32.
180. Procedure for Complaints by Individuals Under the Human Rights Treaties,
UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH COMM’R, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/
TBPetitions/Pages/IndividualCommunications.aspx#proceduregenerale (last visited Oct. 4, 
2018).
181. See infra Appendix 5, p. 74, question 26.
182. Interviewee ## 2, 23.
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mentioned that he used to send mail to the HRC through a third country be-
cause he was afraid that the government monitored the mail services and 
therefore could have prevented important mail from reaching the HRC.183
Another interviewee also mentioned in this regard that written correspond-
ence with the HRC is always opened and read by the government before it 
reaches its destination.184
Another factor that could pose a problem for the accessibility of the 
HRC is the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies. As in most other in-
ternational tribunals,185 applicants are required to exhaust all possible do-
mestic remedies before bringing a communication to the international lev-
el.186 The question, in this regard, is how closely the tribunal follows this 
rule and whether it makes any exceptions to it. The OP itself states in article 
5(2)(b) that domestic remedies should not be exhausted when “the applica-
tion of remedies is unreasonably prolonged.”187 Additionally, according to 
the jurisprudence of the HRC, the available remedy should be an “effective”
one.188 Therefore, for states with authoritarian regimes, the HRC is much 
more open to hearing cases, even if the applicants did not exhaust all the 
possible national remedies.189
When asked whether domestic courts were impartial in deciding the 
case,190 63% of the interviewees answered that they thought that the domes-
tic courts were not impartial, but rather influenced, to some degree, by the 
government. However, all but two of the interviewees actually claimed to 
have exhausted all possible domestic remedies before bringing a communi-
cation to the HRC.191 The two interviewees who said that they did not ex-
haust domestic remedies explained that the reason for that was the heavy 
political influence on the courts in those states.192 When asked about exhaus-
tion of domestic remedies, almost all the interviewees pointed out that they 
had no other choice than to go through the whole domestic procedure and 
that they did not even consider bringing a communication to the HRC with-
out doing so. This may indicate that this requirement is seen as essential, 
183. Interviewee # 2.
184. Interviewee # 23.
185. EGAN, supra note 98, at 277; TYAGI, supra note 49, at 479.
186. Optional Protocol, supra note 8, arts. 2, 5, ¶ 2(b); Rules of Procedure, supra note 
86, r. 96(f).
187. See Lubuto v. Zambia, Comm. 390/1990, U.N. HRC, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/55/D/
390/1990/Rev.1 (Oct. 31, 1995); Rajapakse v. Sri Lanka, Comm. 1250/2004, U.N. HRC, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/87/D/1250/2004 (July 14, 2006).
188. TYAGI, supra note 49, at 494–96.
189. Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea, Comm. 468/1991, U.N. HRC, U.N. Doc. CCPR/
C/49/D/468/1991 (Nov. 10, 1993); Kodirov v. Uzbekistan, Comm.1284/2004, U.N. HRC, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/97/D/1284/2004 (Oct. 20, 2009); TYAGI, supra note 49, at 496.
190. See infra Appendix 5, p. 72, question 3.
191. See infra Appendix 5, p. 72, question 4.
192. Interviewee ## 7, 16.
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and therefore, potential applicants and their representatives are afraid to take 
the risk that their communication will be declared inadmissible, despite the 
fact that, in many of the countries, the judicial system is influenced by the 
government.
When asked whether the state attempted to argue that the communica-
tion was inadmissible on the grounds of lack of exhaustion of domestic 
remedies,193 half of the interviewees answered that such a claim was actually 
made by the state. However, only five interviewees mentioned exhaustion of 
domestic remedies as an obstacle to the accessibility of the HRC.194 One of 
them suggested that, perhaps in countries with problematic records, the 
HRC should not insist on this admissibility criterion.195 Another interviewee 
said that proving the exhaustion of domestic remedies was a real problem 
for many people from his country since there is no local culture of docu-
menting all official government actions.196 Finally, one interviewee men-
tioned that his NGO sometimes raises money specifically for domestic liti-
gation in order to access the HRC when it is exhausted.197
As discussed earlier, money and other resources needed to access a le-
gal institution have long been regarded as one of the most important aspects 
of access to justice. Even though the HRC does not have a litigation fund as 
some of the regional systems do, the descriptive statistics about representa-
tion suggest that the HRC is very accessible. As mentioned above, the ap-
plicant was not represented in about 40% of the cases before the HRC. 
However, following the interviews, a few doubts may be cast on the authen-
ticity of this number. First of all, among the interviewees who represented 
themselves, everyone either had a legal education or was a prominent hu-
man rights activist. An interviewee from a country against which many
communications are filed sounded very doubtful that people without legal or 
human rights education would be able to file communications by them-
selves. He told me that, in many cases, even if no representative in a com-
munication against his country was mentioned, he knew the identity of the 
“shadow representative” in the case.198 Moreover, when interviewees were 
asked whether they helped applicants to file communications without being 
officially listed as the representatives,199 43% answered in the affirmative.
However, another interviewee who works for an NGO said that she did 
know a few people who managed communications by themselves from be-
ginning to end.200
193. See infra Appendix 5, p. 72, question 5.
194. Interviewee ## 12, 13, 14, 15, 28.
195. Interviewee # 12.
196. Interviewee # 13.
197. Interviewee # 24.
198. Interviewee # 2.
199. See infra Appendix 5, p. 73, question 15.
200. Interviewee # 29.
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The reasons for choosing not to be listed as representatives were di-
verse. The most common reason was fear of retribution by the state. Some 
interviewees mentioned that, whereas they always chose to be mentioned as 
the representative (among other reasons, because they thought that they had 
an ethical responsibility to do so), they said that they were familiar with 
lawyers who chose not to be officially listed as representatives because they 
feared state retribution.201 This answer was especially common among law-
yers from countries with problematic human rights records. Some represent-
atives did not want their names mentioned in very political cases, and this 
was true even for representatives from democratic countries. Others men-
tioned that they were not always listed officially as a representative because 
the applicant did the main work himself, and they only gave general (or spe-
cific) advice.202 An interviewee also noted that his colleagues sometimes 
prefer not to list themselves as the representatives because they believe that 
the HRC treats unrepresented applicants more favorably.203 Finally, it was 
also noted that sometimes representatives choose not to be officially listed 
because others have already been listed in that capacity.204 Therefore, even 
though the quantitative part suggested that the HRC was very accessible in 
this regard, the interviews revealed that the picture is probably quite differ-
ent.
When asked about payment for assistance in filing a communication,205
75% of the interviewees answered that they handled the communication as a 
pro bono case and that the applicant did not pay for it. As mentioned, some
interviewees from NGOs noted that they had special fundraising for litiga-
tion, since they actually never ask the applicants for money for representa-
tion before the HRC. It should be noted in this regard that the fact that so 
many of the interviewees said they had not been paid should not necessarily 
be taken as representing reality. This is because there is good reason to be-
lieve that NGOs and lawyers handling cases pro bono would probably be 
more likely to be responsive to an invitation for an interview as compared to 
lawyers who were paid regular fees for representation. Regarding the other 
options, only three interviewees mentioned that the applicant himself paid 
for legal services, one said that another NGO paid for the representation,206
and two said that the government against which the communication was 
brought paid the fee.207 Finally, one of the interviewees refused to disclose 
who paid for the representation.
201. Interviewee ## 2, 24.
202. Interviewee ## 11, 12, 15, 29.
203. Interviewee # 2.
204. Interviewee # 11.
205. See infra Appendix 5, p. 73, question 19.
206. Interviewee # 4.
207. Interviewee ## 10, 19.
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As for the amount of resources—both time and money invested in the 
communications—the answers were very diverse. In general, interviewees 
were not very keen to talk about the amount that they paid or were paid for 
their work, and some refused to answer the question. Those who agreed to 
answer mentioned an amount between $4,500 and $6,800. An interviewee 
who represented a case with many applicants said that each applicant paid 
him around $115. When asked about the hours that it took to work on the 
communication, the answers were very diverse, and it seemed to depend 
mainly on how novel the case was, how complex the facts of the case were, 
and whether the representative was familiar with the facts of the case from 
the national proceedings.208 The answers varied from 15 hours for a “stand-
ard” deportation case represented by a lawyer who also represented the ap-
plicant in the national proceedings to “hundreds of hours” for a case in 
which the NGO wished to set a new precedent for a subject on which the 
HRC did not have significant jurisprudence.
The next criterion to be examined is that of persecution and harassment 
by the state.209 The persecution and harassment of individuals and groups 
cooperating with the UN treaty bodies is a known problem. Therefore, in 
July 2015, the chairpersons of the treaty bodies met and wrote the “Guide-
lines against Intimidation and Reprisals (the “San José Guidelines”).210 Peo-
ple filing individual communications with the HRC are especially prone to 
persecution because, according to the OP, anonymous communications are 
not allowed.211 Therefore, paragraph 19 of the San José Guidelines reads as 
follows:
When it is alleged that an individual or group is at risk of intimida-
tion or reprisals for seeking to communicate or for having commu-
nicated with a treaty body, including as a result of filing or of con-
sidering or attempting to file a formal complaint to a treaty body in 
the framework of the individual communications procedures, the 
committee concerned can request the relevant State party to adopt 
protection measures for the individual or group concerned. Such 
measures can include requests to refrain from any acts of intimida-
tion or reprisals and to adopt all measures necessary to protect 
those at risk. The State party may be requested to provide the 
208. While some representatives helped the applicants in the national proceedings, oth-
ers worked on the case only on the level of the HRC. Obviously, it took more time for the lat-
ter to work on the case since they had to familiarize themselves with the facts and legal argu-
ments.
209. Since this is a very sensitive topic, I chose not to indicate the number of the inter-
viewees cited.
210. Chairpersons of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies, Guidelines against Intimidation 
or Reprisals (“San José Guidelines”), U.N. Doc. HRI/MC/2015/6 (July 30, 2015) [hereinafter 
San José Guidelines].
211. Optional Protocol, supra note 8, art. 3.
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committee, within a specific deadline, with information on 
measures taken to comply with the request.
Indeed, persecution was probably the most sensitive topic raised during 
the interviews, and, unsurprisingly, many interviewees were hesitant to 
speak about their personal experiences. Some were more open to discussing 
the experiences of others on this subject, but not their own. This is how one 
of the interviewees, who works for an NGO, described the situation in one 
of the more problematic countries in this regard:
[T]he government itself and that opposition party and police and 
security persons, they try to harass us. They try to make hurdles in 
our working moralities. They often . . . now, . . . now there are so 
many things. They always harass to that victims, witnesses as well. 
These people, they also exaggerate things. They . . . on lies, yeah?
. . .
They try to manipulate the victims and, “These people are not 
working in favor of you.” That, “These people are just like doing 
that dollar business, business of dollars. They are just, like, they are 
spy of ours.” That, “They are working for that international com-
munity and that international people.” Blame is there from one side, 
and other side the harassment and psychological torture, and some-
times, threats to the victims and manipulation to the victims. These 
are things that commonly happen in [the country]. Yeah.
Another interviewee, a human rights lawyer from a very democratic 
country, answered the question about state retribution in this manner:
No, nothing we have detected, but it does operate at a different lev-
el. There is a chilling effect, because typically in response to UN 
findings, conservative governments like this one routinely come out 
and say, “we’re not going to be bullied by bureaucrats in Geneva. 
We’re a sovereign country. We get to decide what happens in our 
country.” There’s quite a strong negative reaction amongst con-
servatives in [the country].
. . .
No, obviously from time to time, senior politicians, ministers, in-
cluding the Attorney General, come out and say mean things about 
me in the media, but I can live with that.
When asked whether the applicant was afraid of harassment or persecu-
tion,212 25% of the interviewees answered in the affirmative. It seems that 
212. See infra Appendix 5, p. 73, question 21.
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the representatives were less afraid of harassment or persecution:213 only 
three representatives said that they were. When asked why the applicant or 
the representative was afraid of persecution or harassment,214 the most 
common answers were either that they personally experienced it in the past 
for being involved in human rights activities or because it was widely 
known that the government mistreated human rights activists. Two inter-
viewees also observed that their main fear was not for themselves but for 
their families. Some of the interviewees mentioned that they were not afraid 
of persecution and harassment only because they were already used to those 
from being human rights activists. Also, several interviewees mentioned 
that they knew people who chose not to file communications because they 
feared state persecution. Finally, some of the representatives (mainly 
NGOs) said that they were not afraid of state persecution because they 
worked in different countries than the country against which communication 
was filed.
When asked whether the applicant or the representative actually experi-
enced persecution or harassment,215 one-third of the interviewees answered 
in the affirmative. There were several ways in which interviewees were per-
secuted or knew about others being persecuted following the filing of a 
communication with the HRC.216 First, applicants were summoned repeated-
ly to the local police for questioning, and police searches were conducted in 
their homes. Additionally, several interviewees had criminal proceedings 
initiated against them for false allegations, and steps like disbarring the law-
yer in the case were taken. One interviewee was arrested without trial (ad-
ministrative arrest) following the initiation of proceedings before the HRC. 
Another form of harassment mentioned was constantly asking the person to 
file taxes, even if he was under no legal obligation to do so. It was also not-
ed that sometimes police and government officials try to persuade people 
and their families not to file or to withdraw communications and that people 
were harassed even at their workplaces.
Another form of harassment mentioned was government officials trying 
to make the applicants sign statements which contradicted their claims in 
the communications. Some of the representatives even said that, at times, 
they worked to convince the applicants not to withdraw their communica-
tions following state persecution. It is likely that certain groups are more 
prone to the fear of harassment than others—for instance, one interviewee 
mentioned that he knew a gay person who was afraid of bringing a commu-
nication regarding discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation in a 
country which is very conservative on those issues. In another case that in-
volved minority rights, a minority who was already discriminated against 
213. See infra Appendix 5, p. 73, question 22.
214. See infra Appendix 5, p. 73, question 23.
215. See infra Appendix 5, p. 74, question 24.
216. See infra Appendix 5, p. 74, question 25.
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was afraid that the discrimination would increase following the filing of the 
communication. Finally, in death penalty cases, there was a fear that the 
state would implement the sentence faster before a final decision by the 
HRC.
Sometimes harassment also takes a “public” form—some interviewees 
mentioned that they were portrayed by politicians and by the local media as 
“traitors” who damaged the national interest by bringing their problems to 
international institutions. One of the strategies for avoiding harassment was 
keeping the filing of the communication secret. In those cases, the govern-
ment found out about it only after it was officially required to submit a re-
sponse by the HRC, and the chances of persecution were lower.
Whereas one interviewee mentioned that the harassment measures by 
the government were severe but not life-threatening, another interviewee 
said that the authorities sent him actual death threats. An additional inter-
viewee even mentioned that he had to flee the country because the state per-
secuted him for bringing cases to international institutions, including a 
communication before the HRC. An interviewee also observed that, in one 
of the cases he presented before the HRC, the applicant decided eventually 
not to ask for implementation of the decision on the national level because 
he was afraid of persecution.
The next criteria of access to justice is the quality of the remedy provid-
ed by the HRC. The common practice of the HRC currently is to indicate 
both a specific remedy for the applicant in the communication and general 
measures that the state needs to undertake in order to ensure that the viola-
tion does not occur again.217 Among the remedies that the HRC has pre-
scribed in recent years are a general “effective remedy” as well as more 
specific remedies such as adequate compensation,218 public apology,219
commutation of the death sentence,220 retrial,221 effective investigation,222
and prosecution of individuals who allegedly violated the human rights of 
the applicant.223 Unlike some other international tribunals, the HRC never 
indicates the amount of the compensation which should be paid to the appli-
cant, but leaves it de facto to the state itself to determine.224
217. TYAGI, supra note 49, at 556.
218. Shchetko v. Belarus, U.N. HRC, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/87/D/1009/2001, ¶ 6 (Aug. 8, 
2006).
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220. Chisanga v. Zambi, U.N. HRC, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1132/2002 (Nov. 3, 
2005).
221. Kurbonov v. Tajikistan, U.N. HRC, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/86/D/1208/2003 (Mar. 16, 
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When asked about the remedy that they received,225 the interviewees in-
deed indicated all the remedies mentioned above. Although the HRC is of-
ten criticized for not providing detailed enough remedies,226 72% of the in-
terviewees stated that the remedies mentioned in the decision of the HRC 
were detailed enough.227 However, some interviewees answered the question 
in the affirmative with reservations: for instance, one of the interviewees 
mentioned that the remedies were detailed enough only because the re-
spondent country was one with a good human rights record.228 Another in-
terviewee answered that, while in this case the remedies were detailed, in 
other cases he presented before the HRC, the remedies were not detailed 
enough.229
Among those who answered that the remedy was not detailed enough, 
the following reasons were offered. First, the HRC did not elaborate enough 
as to how the administrative procedures and laws which were the subject of 
the communication should be amended.230 Two other interviewees com-
plained that, although it was absolutely clear that the legislation should be 
changed so that the country would not be in violation of the ICCPR, the 
HRC avoided saying that in a straightforward manner.231 Some interviewees 
also mentioned the lack of indication of the amount of compensation as a 
major problem with the remedy given.232 It was suggested that leaving the 
determination of the exact amount to the respondent state made it easier for 
the state to avoid implementing the decision.233 Finally, one interviewee 
mentioned that some of the unclearness in the remedy was resolved during 
the follow-up procedure with the special rapporteur.234
Since the state eventually has to implement the decision of the HRC, a 
very important criterion is the difficulty in implementing the decision on the 
domestic level. As mentioned above, there is a debate regarding the norma-
tive status of the decisions under the OP. Therefore, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
according to the report of the Open Society, only slightly more than 12% of 
the HRC decisions under the OP have been fully implemented.235 When 
225. See infra Appendix 5, p. 74, question 30.
226. TYAGI, supra note 49, at 559.
227. See infra Appendix 5, p. 74, question 31.
228. Interviewee # 29.
229. Interviewee # 20.
230. Interviewee ## 9, 13, 24.
231. Interviewee ## 14, 30.
232. Interviewee ## 9, 14, 24, 26.
233. Interviewee # 24.
234. Interviewee # 24.
235. See OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 54, at 199 (defining “satisfacto-
ry implementation” as “the willingness of the State party to implement the Committee’s rec-
ommendations or to offer the complainant an appropriate remedy”).
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asked whether the decision was implemented by the state,236 only two of the 
23 interviewees answered that the decision was indeed fully implemented 
by the respondent state.237 57% of the interviewees answered that the deci-
sion was not implemented, and 35% answered that there was partial imple-
mentation.
When interviewees who indicated partial implementation were asked to 
elaborate, they answered that, in some cases, the states did try to “remedy”
the damage caused to the specific victim by paying the applicant monetary 
compensation, but it did not amend the wider legislative framework to pre-
vent future violations.238 In other cases, even the damage caused to the ap-
plicant himself was not fully remedied. In one case, the applicant was extra-
dited, contrary to the decision of the HRC, but the state showed willingness 
to give monetary compensation.239 In another case, the applicant was re-
leased from custody but did not receive compensation.240 Also, one inter-
viewee mentioned that the law was amended only in order to remedy the 
specific violation to the applicant.241 Another interviewee mentioned that the 
state agreed to grant the applicant retrial regarding his application for asy-
lum, but eventually, contrary to the decision of the HRC, did not grant him 
asylum.242 Finally, sadly, in one case, the interviewee mentioned that the 
state did not wait for the final decision of the HRC and executed the appli-
cant,243 and in another case, the applicant was deported before the HRC 
reached a decision on his application.244
An additional and important element of implementation at the domestic 
level is whether the applicant has to undergo additional proceedings on the 
national level or whether the decision is implemented automatically by the 
state. When asked about this (question 36), 58% of the interviewees said 
that they had to undergo additional proceedings in order for the state to im-
plement the decision of the HRC. The rest of the interviewees said that they 
did not have to initiate additional proceedings on the national level. In this 
regard, one of the interviewees from a state against which many communi-
cations to the HRC are filed mentioned that a group of human rights activ-
ists and lawyers are trying to promote legislation that would indicate exactly 
236. See infra Appendix 5, p. 74, question 35.
237. This question was relevant only for decisions in which the HRC found a violation 
of the ICCPR.
238. Interviewee ## 8, 12, 29.
239. Interviewee, # 22.
240. Interviewee # 6.
241. Interviewee # 25.
242. Interviewee # 4.
243. Interviewee # 2.
244. Interviewee # 6.
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how decisions should be implemented on the national level since it is cur-
rently unclear.245
Finally, I asked interviewees about other difficulties and concerns that 
they had about the process before the HRC (questions 27 and 32). The main 
concern that was raised by no less than 20 interviewees was the time that it 
takes the HRC to process a communication and to reach a final decision.246
As noted above, the average time between the registration and a final deci-
sion on the case was three and a half years.247 One interviewee observed that 
procedures are too prolonged because the secretariat does not insist on time 
frames with states:248
A few things which came up which were really frustrating along 
the way. One was that the Committee provides time frames within 
which the state must respond to the committee. [the state] routinely 
ignores those time frames, whether it’s 3 months or 6 months, de-
pending on the phase, they’re different. Those are firmly written in 
the rules. When we complained about that, that [the state] was rou-
tinely late, and by late I don’t just mean weeks or days, I mean in 
one case a year later, so there’s a guy sitting in detention and yet 
you’re waiting up to a year for the government to respond to your 
submission. The Committee doesn’t do anything about it. The 
Committee might send a little letter to the state reminding them or 
something, or they might not. We never really know, because they 
don’t really tell us. There’s no serious pressure brought by the 
Committee. The Committee just cops it. They just accept that gov-
ernments can accept whenever they like. That’s pretty frustrating, 
because what’s the point of rules of procedure if they don’t mean 
anything?
On the other hand, other interviewees said that the procedure before the 
HRC was faster than expected.249
Another significant problem mentioned was a language barrier.250 The 
UN has six official languages (English, French, Spanish, Russian, Arabic, 
and Chinese),251 and a communication can be filed only in one of those lan-
guages. Therefore, interviewees indicated that, when the language of the 
state was not one of the six official languages, it was at times burdensome to 
245. Interviewee # 24.
246. Interviewee ## 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 20, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 
30.
247. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Strengthening the United Nations Human Rights 
Treaty Body System, at 19, U.N. Doc. A/66/860 (June 26, 2012).
248. Interviewee # 20.
249. Interviewee ## 8, 18, 19, 20, 25, 31, 33.
250. Interviewee ## 4, 8, 22, 26.
251. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), DEP’T FOR GEN. ASSEMBLY & CONF. MGMT.,
http://www.un.org/depts/DGACM/faqs.shtml (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
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translate all the documents into one of those languages. In this regard, one 
of the interviewees said that the ECtHR might be better for applicants if 
they were found under its jurisdiction, since it is possible to file a communi-
cation there in the language of the country.252 One of the interviewees men-
tioned that if they filed the communication in English, the cost of translation 
to the language of the respondent state many times falls on the shoulders of 
the applicants themselves. This is because the secretariat does not have suf-
ficient resources to do it on its own.253 Another interviewee said that even 
though Arabic is an official UN language, there is still a preference for fil-
ing a communication in English.254
Finally, some interviewees found the inability of the HRC to hold oral 
hearings and reevaluate facts to be a significant barrier to the accessibility of 
justice.255 It was also mentioned by some that the process is complicated and 
unclear, making it very hard to plan litigation in a strategic way.256
iii.  Interpersonal Impressions from the Process
Regarding communication with the UN staff during the process, there 
seemed to be a spectrum of opinions. When asked whether the secretariat 
kept the interviewees updated about the progress of the communication,257
half of the interviewees answered in the affirmative. However, in the more 
open questions,258 many of the interviewees were much more critical of the 
way in which the secretariat operates. One interviewee, a lawyer, described 
his experience as follows:259
In this particular case, I do remember that in the beginning they lost 
the file, so we had to, after some months, because we were follow-
ing up with them, because we hadn’t gotten an acknowledgement 
letter, because usually you get a letter in about a month saying, 
“Thank you for your communication, blah, blah, blah,” and they 
didn’t give us that. We had to chase them up for months, and then 
they finally said that they lost the file, they admitted receiving it, 
and then said that it had been misplaced. We actually had to send 
them another one, and I remember at the time that my client was 
quite upset about that, because he was hoping that they would help 
him. He was saying that he was wrongfully in prison, and obvious-
ly he wanted a quick process, as quick as possible, so literally some 
252. Interviewee # 4.
253. Interviewee # 26.
254. Interviewee # 7.
255. Interviewee ## 10, 13, 17, 23.
256. Interviewee ## 12, 20.
257. See infra Appendix 5, p. 74, question 33.
258. See infra Appendix 5, p. 74, question 27, 32.
259. Interviewee # 5.
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months were wasted just because they lost the files. He was quite 
disappointed in that, obviously.
The most common complaints were that the secretariat was inefficient, 
lacking resources, unprofessional, and understaffed.260 It seems that all the 
other complaints about the secretariat stemmed from these problems. For 
instance, it was mentioned that it was hard to reach the secretariat in order 
to ask questions (especially regarding the progress of the communication) 
and that the staff was not very responsive, even to emails.261 Some inter-
viewees mentioned that, at times, the secretariat did not respond to emails at 
all.262 Another interviewee said that, whereas the secretariat was responsive 
to emails, it agreed to provide only very basic and general information re-
garding the case.263 It was also mentioned that the secretariat did not 
acknowledge the receipt of a communication or other documents, that it was 
unclear how much time it would take for the secretariat to register the claim, 
and that it was hard to find out whether the communication was registered at 
all.264 Another interviewee complained about loss of documents.265
As for the more substantive work of the secretariat, the interviewees 
said that the decisions of the secretariat were arbitrary and not comprehen-
sive. Interviewees also mentioned that, many times, it seemed that the secre-
tariat did not read the material sent to it because there were factual mistakes 
in the documents that it sent back. For instance, the secretariat claimed that 
a certain document was not provided when in fact it was. It was also men-
tioned  that the documents sent by the secretariat discussed irrelevant 
points.266 Finally, interviewees said that the secretariat did not on its own 
initiative follow up on whether the state sent an answer to the communica-
tion—at all or within the time frame prescribed—and that sometimes the 
interviewees themselves had to remind the secretariat about this.267
Even though there seemed to be some discontent with the way in which 
the secretariat operated, when it came to the question of the fairness of the 
process itself,268 83% of the interviewees regarded the process before the 
HRC as fair. Among the reasons the interviewees listed as undermining the 
fairness of the process were a lack of transparency, lack of information from 
the secretariat, and lack of a “personal touch” in handling communica-
tions.269 It was also mentioned that the legal reasoning of the HRC was un-
260. Interviewee ## 2, 5, 6, 7, 16, 26.
261. Interviewee ## 16, 17, 22, 23.
262. Interviewee # 2.
263. Interviewee # 10.
264. Interviewee ## 3, 22, 23.
265. Interviewee # 5.
266. Interviewee ## 5, 14, 20, 22.
267. Interviewee ## 7, 20, 32.
268. See infra Appendix 5, p. 74, question 34.
269. Interviewee ## 5, 17, 22, 31.
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clear and that the decisions seemed arbitrary.270 One interviewee thought 
that the decisions were influenced by politics.271 Finally, another interviewee 
mentioned that he never got a chance to see the answer of the state to the 
communication and therefore was not given a proper chance to write a re-
sponse to it.272
Even though, from the previous questions, it seems that the interview-
ees thought that there were significant flaws with the individual communi-
cations system, when asked whether they would encourage other people to 
file communications,273 93.5% of the interviewees answered in the affirma-
tive. The same percentage of interviewees also stated that they would con-
sider filing another communication with the HRC themselves in the fu-
ture.274
When asked to give a reason why they would recommend others to 
bring a communication to the HRC, the main, and perhaps obvious, reason 
was that the decisions of the HRC could be implemented by the state now or 
in the future and perhaps influence the way in which the state acts in similar 
cases.275 One of the interviewees even mentioned that, the more cases there 
were against a state, the higher were the chances that the state would even-
tually implement the decisions of the HRC.276 An additional reason that 
many interviewees mentioned was that it is beneficial to have access to an 
independent international body monitoring the implementation of the 
ICCPR.277 It was also suggested that the HRC is less political than other na-
tional and international institutions278 and faster than the regional systems.279
Another category of answers was that filing communications to the HRC 
raised awareness of human rights violations,280 documented and recognized 
human rights violations,281 and allowed people to insist on their legal rights 
against the violating state.282 Several applicants even mentioned that they 
actively encouraged other lawyers and NGOs to file communications,283 and 
one even runs a special program that trains lawyers and NGOs how to file 
270. Interviewee ## 5, 22.
271. Interviewee # 12.
272. Interviewee # 31.
273. See infra Appendix 5, p. 75, question 44.
274. See infra Appendix 5, p. 75, question 46.
275. Interviewee ## 2, 14, 19, 22, 23, 25, 26, 28.
276. Interviewee # 3.
277. Interviewee ## 5, 8, 9, 10, 18, 29.
278. Interviewee # 10.
279. Interviewee # 29.
280. Interviewee ## 1, 2, 8, 20.
281. Interviewee ## 2, 7, 11, 16.
282. Interviewee # 17.
283. Interviewee ## 3, 11, 13.
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communications to the HRC.284 Finally, several interviewees mentioned that 
filing communications with the HRC was important in order to develop the 
jurisprudence of international human rights law.285
On the other hand, some interviewees said that they would recommend 
filing a communication to the HRC only if there were no other forums in 
which to bring the case.286 Additionally, two of the interviewees said that 
they would not recommend filing a communication with the HRC because 
the decisions of the HRC are not implemented by states. When the inter-
viewees were asked why they would prefer not to file communications to 
the HRC in the future,287 the reasons were lack of implementation and that 
filing communications that were not implemented by the state harms the 
reputation and credibility of the NGO.288
The interviewees were also asked whether they believed that the deci-
sion in their case had an impact beyond the specific case.289 74% answered 
that they believed that the decision in their case did have a wider impact. 
The reasons for that varied. Some interviewees believed that the decision 
influences, or might influence in the future, the behavior of the authorities in 
their countries.290 Some also mentioned that it empowers other people from 
their state to insist on their human rights in various situations.291 Others sug-
gested that the impact was more international, like development of jurispru-
dence on a certain subject292 or drawing international attention to a prob-
lem.293 Also, two interviewees spoke in terms of “empowerment of 
marginalized people”294 and “giving hope.”295
V. Discussion of the Findings and 
Suggestions for Possible Reforms
This part evaluates the success of access to justice under the OP from 
the perspective of the three main stakeholders—the member states, the 
HRC, and the applicants. Additionally, it suggests ways to make the HRC 
more accessible in light of the empirical findings of this study and the sug-
gestions of previous literature about access to justice. I also include relevant 
284. Interviewee # 11.
285. Interviewee ## 1, 16, 18.
286. Interviewee ## 15, 17, 18.
287. See infra Appendix 5, p. 75, question 46.
288. Interviewee # 12, 30.
289. See infra Appendix 5, pp. 74–75, question 37.
290. Interviewee ## 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 14, 22, 23, 24.
291. Interviewee ## 2, 12, 13, 23.
292. Interviewee ## 6, 12, 16, 18, 20, 27, 31, 32.
293. Interviewee ## 13, 14, 20.
294. Interviewee # 29.
295. Interviewee # 28.
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suggestions from interviewees.296 It should also be noted that, in 2012, the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a report on strengthening the 
UN human rights treaty body system.297 Although the discussion in the cur-
rent Article is limited to specific reforms in the context of individual com-
munications in the HRC, I provide references to the relevant pages in the 
Report in the footnotes.
A. Universality and Equality of Access to the HRC
When we examine the universality and equality of access to the HRC 
criterion, there seems to be a significant problem with the system. This cri-
terion is of special importance since, as mentioned in the Preamble of the 
ICCPR and the OP, it seems that a main goal of the individual communica-
tions procedure was universal implementation of human rights. As was evi-
dent from the quantitative part of this study, the system probably fails in this 
regard. The low number of communications brought, as well as the fact that 
they are mainly filed against states that have a strong political and socioeco-
nomic background, speaks for itself. It seems fair to say that the system is 
very much underused and could reach many more people. This is especially 
disappointing since, as it is today, the entire procedure takes place in writing 
without oral hearings, and therefore, geographical distance from Geneva 
should not be an obstacle. Also, given that access to international institu-
tions is seen as an important tool for promoting marginalized people and 
communities, it is troublesome that people from non-democratic and less 
socioeconomically developed countries, who might be the ones who need 
the most to bring their story before an international institution, are the ones 
who have the least access to it.
The finding that access to the HRC is not distributed equally among dif-
ferent types of countries should be seen as problematic regardless of wheth-
er the role of the system is to grant a remedy implemented on the national 
level, provide general guidelines for member states, or just offer a platform 
for victims to tell their story. It might be assumed that people under the ju-
risdiction of states that are democratic and socioeconomically developed 
bring different types of communications to the HRC than do people under 
the jurisdiction of poor and authoritarian states. Even if one rejects the role 
of the HRC as providing a remedy in a specific case, there is a general sig-
nificance in having applicants from different backgrounds bring communi-
296. See infra Appendix 5, p. 75, question 45.
297. See High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., supra note 247 (discussing a wide reform of the 
treaty system, including a proposal to unify the treaty bodies); see also Shany, The Effective-
ness of the Human Rights Committee and the Treaty Bodies Reform, supra note 81 (providing 
a critique and a discussion of the Report); Anthony J. Ellis, Developing Human Rights Before 
the United Nations Human Rights Committee and in New Zealand Courts: A Practitioner’s
Perspective 221–27 (2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, La Trobe University, 2014) (on 
file with the author of this Article) (arguing that, in the context of New Zealand, the main 
problems are lack of awareness, education, resources and political will). 
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cations of various subject matters before the HRC to establish a diverse ju-
risprudence answering many needs. Moreover, there is a special signifi-
cance in giving people from states with poor human rights record a platform 
to tell their stories to an international body.
However, there is serious doubt as to whether the system as it is today 
is even capable of handling more individual communications. As it current-
ly stands, with less than 150 decisions on individual communications each 
year, the average time period for a decision is three and a half years. Even 
with this small number of communications (relative to the potential), the
impression from the interviews is that both the secretariat and the HRC it-
self have substantial difficulty keeping up with the pace. Therefore, any at-
tempt to make the HRC more accessible will have to take into account that 
the resources provided to the HRC need to be increased significantly as 
well—mainly more staff and more financial resources.298
A more cynical perspective on the situation might suggest that countries 
with problematic human rights records, which are also stakeholders for this 
purpose, could be satisfied with the situation. On the one hand, they have 
the international prestige of being signatories to the OP, but on the other 
hand, the HRC is not sufficiently accessible to applicants from those coun-
tries. Therefore, those countries do not pay a price for their actual human 
rights violations. Such a “misuse” of the system should not be regarded as a 
legitimate interest of a stakeholder according to the rules of interpretation 
provided in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.299 However,
around 60% of the HRC budget comes from voluntary contributions from 
member states,300 and providing the HRC with more resources very much 
depends on the will of member states. Therefore, this hidden interest of 
some states in making the HRC inefficient might create a lack of political 
will to actually change the situation and give the HRC more funding. It 
should be noted that, whereas most of the suggestions to follow indeed de-
mand a significant addition to the budget, some of them might not be as ex-
pensive and hence are perhaps more realistic in the short term.
298. See also High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., supra note 247, at 71–72 (recommending 
that the Committees encourage friendly settlements within the individual communications 
procedures).
299. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, opened for signature May 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith”); see also Shany, The Effectiveness of the Human Rights 
Committee and the Treaty Bodies Reform, supra note 81, at 1327–29 (discussing “what ap-
pears to be a conscious decision by a significant number of state-parties to maintain the treaty 
bodies under permanent conditions of under-effectiveness” and criticizing the High Commis-
sioner for failing to acknowledge this problem).
300. Latest Voluntary Contributions to OHCHR in 2018, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS.
OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/FundingBudget.aspx
(last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
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B. Difficulties in Accessing the HRC
The interviews with people who filed communications to the HRC re-
vealed quite significant difficulties in accessing the HRC. Unsurprisingly, 
the most troubling issue discussed was persecution and harassment by the 
state. This issue can also explain why we see fewer communications from 
states with problematic human rights records. There is no “magic solution”
to this problem since it is very much entwined with the difficulty of making 
states comply with their general human rights obligations. However, the San 
José Guidelines are a good starting point since they acknowledge that such a 
problem indeed exists, and they identify possible ways to fight it. First, the 
Guidelines suggest that the Committees nominate a committee member to 
serve as a rapporteur or focal point for reprisals.301 The main role of those 
special rapporteurs is to be the address for complaints of state reprisals 
against individuals and organizations and to determine the appropriate 
course of action.302 The rapporteur should also compile information on good 
practices relating to protective approaches.303 The treaty body itself is also 
encouraged to adopt protective measures in the appropriate situations304 and 
to raise awareness among member states of the importance of cooperation 
regarding intimidation or reprisals.305
It should be noted, however, that it is necessary for the applicants to 
know about the existence of the special rapporteur, as well as to have an 
ability to access the rapporteur and receive a fast answer. From a search 
conducted on the internet in May 2016, it was unclear whether a special 
rapporteur was indeed appointed and how he or she could be contacted. This 
is a very acute concern since timeliness is crucial for state reprisals that 
could possibly be life-threatening.
On the more optimistic side, 58 countries joined a statement read at the 
session of the Human Rights Council about preventing reprisals toward 
those who cooperate or seek to cooperate with the UN.306 However, given 
that 115 states are parties to the OP, and that many of the states against 
which communications are often filed decided not to join the statement—
most noticeably Belarus, Russia, and Uzbekistan—there is cause for con-
cern.
Another important point was awareness of the existence of the individ-
ual communications mechanism. When interviewees were asked what 
should be done to increase the accessibility of the HRC, the most common 
301. San José Guidelines, supra note 210, ¶¶ 8–14.
302. Id. ¶¶ 12–14.
303. Id. ¶ 17.
304. Id. ¶ 19.
305. Id. ¶ 20.
306. U.S. Joins HRC Joint Statement on Preventing Reprisals, MISSION OF THE UNITED 
STATES GENEVA SWITZ., https://geneva.usmission.gov/2015/09/25/u-s-joins-hrc-joint-
statement-on-preventing-reprisals/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
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answer was raising awareness of the possibility to file a communication to 
the HRC.307 There are several actors that can probably be helpful in that re-
gard: the HRC itself, the secretariat, states, and NGOs. Since 2012, the Of-
fice of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has attempted to make the 
procedures under the UN treaty bodies (including the HRC) better known. 
The efforts have mainly focused on creating a mailing list and improving 
the website.308 However, much more could be done in this regard, and the 
secretariat could be much more active in providing information through the 
internet about the possibility and procedures of filing communications. For 
instance, the secretariat can improve the quality of information on the HRC 
webpage. The secretariat can also be much more active in reaching out to 
NGOs and encouraging them to notify potential applicants about the possi-
bility of bringing communications under the OP through their activities and 
websites. As for the HRC itself, it can demand that countries, as part of their 
bona fide compliance with treaty obligations, take appropriate steps to noti-
fy people under their jurisdictions about the possibility of filing communica-
tions against them. The HRC can examine compliance with this obligation 
within the framework of the periodic state review, and it can also require 
states to publish decisions to which they were parties in official state rec-
ords. These steps do not require too many resources, but they can be very 
effective.
As for the states themselves, they can promote awareness through vari-
ous channels, including through the media, educational programs in law 
faculties, and local legal bars. NGOs can take the initiative to post more in-
formation about individual communications on their websites (as some have 
already done) and make other NGOs in their networks aware of the OP pro-
cedure. Finally, since the main problem is that there are not enough com-
munications from non-democratic countries, perhaps the efforts (especially 
those of the HRC and NGOs) should be focused on countries from which 
communications are not filed very often. In this regard, the simplest thing 
would be to translate materials into local languages. Currently, on the UN 
website, materials are displayed only in the six official UN languages, and a 
one-time effort of the HRC and some NGOs to translate it into more lan-
guages could be very useful.
I do not think that there ought to be a competition between the HRC and 
the regional tribunals as to who gets to adjudicate the case. This is because 
the regional tribunals have larger budgets and probably more political power 
to make states implement their decisions (especially the ECtHR). The most 
important thing is that a person receives a remedy for a human rights viola-
tion committed by the state. There need not be a preference for it to be 
granted by the ICCPR and the HRC.
307. Interviewee ## 1, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22, 23, 25, 28, 29.
308. See also High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., supra note 247, at 89–94.
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Two other significant concerns raised regarding the process were the 
time that it takes to receive a final decision in the communication309 and lan-
guage barriers—that a communication can be brought only in one of the six 
official languages of the UN.310 As was reflected in the interviews, it is no 
secret that the secretariat is very understaffed due to budgetary problems, 
and that even the committee members are often assisted by interns who do 
not receive money from the UN. Although some procedures might be made 
more efficient, it is hard to see how the procedure can be made much faster 
without a larger budget. The same is true for the ability to bring a communi-
cation in additional languages—it is hard to see how to enable this without 
budgeting for more translators into languages that are not the official UN 
languages.
Some other difficulties with access to the HRC might be more easily 
addressed. For instance, it seems that the HRC is open and accessible to re-
ceiving communications filed in different ways (email, regular mail, and 
fax). However, the ability to fill out a form online and attach the relevant 
documents might make it even more accessible.311 This would also make the 
HRC more accessible to people without legal representation.
As for the legal representation itself, although in about 40% of the cases 
it was not indicated that the applicant was represented, the reality, as re-
flected in the interviews, might be quite different. It is hard to tell whether 
the reason that applicants tend to be represented is because the legal repre-
sentative informs them about the possibility to file communications with the 
HRC in the first place, or because potential applicants have trouble with the 
procedure of filing communications and feel that they are in need of legal 
assistance. However, at least from the interviews, it seems that filing a 
communication is not a significant financial burden and that many lawyers 
and NGOs are ready to do this work pro bono. Therefore, perhaps from this 
perspective once again, NGOs and even international law clinics at law 
schools should focus more on offering legal assistance in countries where 
information about the HRC is less accessible. Another suggestion for in-
creasing accessibility to the HRC is to make the states responsible for fi-
nancing legal aid to people who wish to file communications against them 
in the HRC, or at least do so if the case is decided to be admissible by the 
HRC.
As for the question of exhaustion of domestic remedies, the internation-
al legal system is probably not ready to grant access to international institu-
tions without the exhaustion of domestic remedies. As discussed, the reason 
for that is that, under the current framework of international law, the state is 
the primary enforcer of human rights. This is a doctrine adopted both by the 
HRC as well as by the regional systems. Although perhaps local courts can-
309. Interviewee ## 2, 3, 20, 23, 24.
310. Interviewee ## 4, 7, 8.
311. Interviewee # 24.
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not always be trusted to be impartial, most of the applicants exhaust domes-
tic remedies, and throughout the interviews, many showed understanding of 
the rationale behind this requirement. It also seems that, through its juris-
prudence, the HRC does a good job of addressing cases in which exhaustion 
of domestic remedies is futile and prevents states from using this require-
ment unfairly. However, in cases against states that have a problematic hu-
man rights record, perhaps the HRC should be even more open to hearing 
communications, even if not all local remedies have been exhausted.312
When it comes to the criterion of the quality of the remedy, the major 
problem seems to be that the HRC does not indicate the exact amount of 
compensation. This is unlike the practice of other regional courts, and it 
gives the states more margin not to comply with the decision. Although it is 
true that it is hard to calculate the exact remedy and take into account the 
specific economic conditions in 115 states, the HRC should nevertheless 
make more efforts in this regard.313 For instance, it can ask both the appli-
cant and the respondent state to give a certain estimation of the amount that 
should be paid as compensation and then decide. This is of special im-
portance if the HRC wants to be regarded more as a court and to insist that 
its decisions should be binding upon states.314 Also, not indicating an exact 
remedy can be an additional excuse on behalf of member states not to im-
plement a decision.
Finally, there seems to be significant difficulty in implementing deci-
sions at the national level. This was evident both from the data of the Open 
Society report about implementation and from the answers of interviewees 
to the relevant questions. Some of the difficulty might be due to the debate 
on the normative status of the decisions under the OP, but it is likely that 
many states simply lack the political will to implement those decisions and 
do not give them due consideration. Even though some interviewees men-
tioned that they brought a communication for the symbolic significance, in 
75% of the cases, the applicants still mentioned implementation as a motiva-
tion for filing a communication. Also, the HRC itself has been actively 
promoting implementation in recent years. Therefore, whereas perhaps it 
can be argued that certain states want to see the decisions as mere recom-
mendations, the HRC and the applicants, who are the other major stake-
holders, see it as a very important part of the process.
312. Interviewee # 13.
313. Interviewee ## 14, 26.
314. Interviewee ## 3, 14, 18; see also High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., supra note 247, at 
70 (suggesting that “[t]o the extent possible, remedies should be framed in a way that allows 
their implementation to be measured and should be prescriptive.” The High Commissioner 
also recommended to “include in final decisions on the merits, to the extent possible, not only 
specific and targeted remedies for the victim in question but also general recommendations in 
order to ensure the non-repetition of similar violations in the future, such as changes in law or 
practice.”).
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There is no easy solution to the problem of the lack of implementation 
of the decisions by member states. The HRC already has a special rappor-
teur for follow-up on communications, and states are required to report on 
the status of the implementation of decisions. Also, the HRC itself inquires 
of State parties during the periodical review whether and why its decisions 
on individual communications have not been implemented.315 Perhaps in this 
regard the HRC can increase the pressure on states to comply with its deci-
sions—mainly through more frequent enquiries by the special rapporteur. 
Another possibility is to raise the lack of implementation in other interna-
tional forums that might create diplomatic pressure (like the Universal Peri-
odic Review in the Human Rights Council). In this regard, NGOs can also 
be more proactive and run campaigns naming and shaming states that do not 
comply with the decisions of the HRC. Finally, in many cases, it is also un-
clear what the national procedure for implementing the decisions of the 
HRC is. Perhaps a possible solution to this problem is to demand that coun-
tries which are parties to the OP publish clear guidelines on how a decision 
will be implemented.
C. Interpersonal Impressions from the Process
Although the major complaint of this criterion regarded the way in 
which the secretariat operated, there is room to be more optimistic on other 
issues. As for the communication with the UN staff during the process, 
many complained that the secretariat was not responsive enough (or at all) 
to applicants.316 It should be noted that the Author of this Article also expe-
rienced difficulties in contacting UN staff while trying to obtain information 
through emails. I will not repeat the discussion about the budgetary prob-
lems, although increasing the secretariat’s budget is obviously the best solu-
tion to this situation. However, since many of the questions addressed to the 
secretariat by the applicants and their representatives were about the status 
315. See, e.g., U.N. HRC, Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of 
Canada, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/CAN/CO/6 (Aug. 13, 2015) (“The Committee is concerned 
about the State party’s reluctance to comply with all of the Committee’s Views and Interim 
Measures under the Covenant and under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (First Optional Protocol), in particular when they relate to rec-
ommendations to reopen Humanitarian and Compassionate applications. The Committee re-
grets the lack of an appropriate mechanism in the State party to implement Views of the 
Committee, with a view, inter alia, to providing victims with effective remedies (art. 2)”); 
U.N. HRC, Concluding Observations of Its Ninety-Fifth Session: Australia, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/AUS/CO/5 (May 7, 2009) (“While acknowledging the measures taken by the State 
party to reduce the likelihood of future communications regarding issues raised in certain of 
its Views, the Committee expresses once again its concern at the State party’s restrictive in-
terpretation of, and failure to fulfil its obligations under the First Optional Protocol and the 
Covenant, and at the fact that victims have not received reparation.”).
316. Interviewee ## 3, 5, 11, 16, 17, 20, 23.
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of the communication, two of the interviewees suggested a simple method 
of online status check.317
As for the other criteria, there is more room for optimism. The system 
itself is perceived as fair, and almost three-quarters of the interviewees even 
thought that their case had a wider impact. Moreover, even though inter-
viewees saw many flaws with the procedures of the system, it was striking 
to discover that 93.5% would consider filing a communication themselves 
or recommend that others do so.
D. General Evaluation of the OP
When the interviewees were asked to evaluate their satisfaction with the 
process under the OP on a scale of 1 to 5,318 the average grade given was 
3.65. This middle-of-the-scale number probably best captures the success of 
the system under the OP—not an entire success, but not an entire failure ei-
ther. As one of the interviewees who has been working for an NGO for a 
long time put it:319
I think that the committee and communications process can be ex-
tremely useful but it needs to be recognized for what it is . . . . You 
see this as a higher hierarchical legal process in the way that we 
within [the country] would see, for example, our upper courts. Then 
it is failure. That’s not what that process is. I think in terms of 
bringing attention to issues and raising those issues and having a 
formal record of breeches that have happened and an assessment of 
what needs to be done in order to rectify those. In a framework, 
which the human rights framework is, of consensus . . . I think that 
they’ve played a very, very valuable role.
The finding that only 12% of the decisions of the HRC under the OP are 
implemented, as well as the low usage rate of the system, are often cited by 
the critics of the HRC as proof of the failure of the system. To this, it should 
probably be added that, as demonstrated in the current research, most of the 
communications come from countries with good political and socioeconom-
ic conditions. Given that, according to the texts of the ICCPR and the OP, 
universality is seen as a goal, and given that the HRC and the interviewees 
aim for the implementation of the decisions, the system might be regarded 
somewhat as a failure. As was demonstrated, the procedures before the 
HRC also suffer from acute problems, many of which derive from the low 
budget of the treaty body system. Moreover, the problem of state retribution 
probably prevents many communications from even being brought to the 
HRC in the first place.
317. Interviewee ## 18, 23.
318. See infra Appendix 5, p. 75, question 47.
319. Interviewee # 16.
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However, implementation and universality are not the only goals of the 
system. It seems that the procedure under the OP is also seen by some as a 
way to raise awareness of certain problems in a country and gives certain 
tools to promote change in member states in the future. Also, one should not 
underestimate the importance of the ability of a person whose human rights 
were violated to receive recognition by an international body that he was 
wronged by the state. If the system was widely regarded as a failure, the 
rates of interviewees wanting or recommending others to use it once again 
would not be as high.
Conclusion
Even though the HRC is only a quasi-judicial institution, existing and 
future international judicial institutions granting access to individuals can 
learn several lessons from the problems of access to justice. The main les-
son is that the international community cannot establish an institution and 
simply assume that all who need a remedy can easily bring their case before 
the institution. Rather, the relevant authorities should ensure that people
have information regarding the possibility of bringing a claim, focusing es-
pecially on countries with poor human rights records and vulnerable popula-
tions.
The international community should also be aware that, even if a state 
agrees to come under the jurisdiction of the institution, it can at the same 
time do things to discourage people from bringing communications against 
it. Therefore, it should be considered in depth how the system can best deal 
with such a conflict of interest. Another important lesson to be learned from 
the HRC—and perhaps from the treaty bodies system in general—is that in-
stitutions should also be well-funded in order to have an accessible and fair 
procedure and provide applicants with a timely remedy. Finally, cooperating 
with civil society seems to be important on the international level, especially 
when the institution itself is underfunded.
The current research might also shed some light on the relative success 
of the European system. The European system is frequently regarded as a
success, and other regions attempt to copy the way that it operates. Howev-
er, as was suggested above, the success of the European regional system 
might be attributed more to the characteristics of the member states of the 
European Convention than to the ways in which the regional human rights 
system operates. Therefore, when designing an international institution 
granting individual access, it is important to understand that it is counter-
productive to simply “copy” a successful institution without being aware of 
the regional particularities.320
320. For a discussion about transplanting legal institutions and the need to adopt them to 
the local particularities, see Karen J. Alter et al., Transplanting the European Court of Justice: 
The Experience of the Andean Tribunal of Justice, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 629, 660–64 (2012).
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As was discussed at the beginning, the idea that individuals are granted 
access to international institutions was celebrated as a big step in interna-
tional human rights law, and rightfully so. The history of human rights 
shows clearly that the existence of a right is not enough; it also needs a sys-
tem of implementation. The international community should now take one 
step further and realize that a mere theoretical right to access the institution 
is not enough. Actual steps need to be taken in order increase access to jus-
tice at the HRC.
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Appendix 1—Table of Variables and Sources
Variable Description Source
Number Number of communications 




Population Population of a country http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Excel-Data/
population.htm
Delta year Number of years from the 
year that the state was a par-











rECtHR Is the respondent country a 
party to the European Con-
vention on human rights at 
the relevant year?
Council of Europe Website:
http://hub.coe.int/
yearECtHR In what year did the country 
join the ECtHR?
Council of Europe Website:
http://hub.coe.int/
rInterAmer Has the country granted ju-
risdiction to the Inter-
American Commission of 





yearInterAmer In what year did the country 





rAfrican Is the State party to the Af-
rican Commission of Human 






yearAfrican When did the country grant 
jurisdiction to the African 






Alternative Could the communication 
have been brought to the 
European Court of Human 
Rights, the Inter-American 
Commission of Human 
Author 
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Rights, or the African 
Commission of Human 
Rights?
Literacy What was the average litera-
cy rate of the population for 
1997–2013?
When the data was not 
available for all the years, 
the average was taken from 




For countries without UNESCO annual in-
formation: http://world.bymap.org/
LiteracyRates.html (rely on CIA country de-
scription).
Rule of Law What is the rule of law rate 
in the country?
For the years 1997, 
1999 and 2001 the 
estimate is the year 





Independence What was the independence 





Speech What was the freedom of 








Human Rights What is the latent mean 
score of the respondent 
country?
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Appendix 2—Number of Communications against Countries 





















































Serbia and Montenegro 3
Uruguay 3





























































The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 0
Tunisia 0
Uganda 0
* I coded communications Jung et al. (1593-1603/2007) CCPR/C/98/D/
1593-1603/2007 (Apr. 30, 2010) as one communication, and Communica-
tions Min-Kyu Jeong et al. (1642-1741/2007) CCPR/C/101/D/1642-1741/
2007 (Apr. 27, 2011) as one communication. Each of those sets of commu-
nications was filed by the same representatives and on the same subject 
(conscientious objection), and therefore the HRC chose to unite them. Since 
these communications would usually have been filed as one unit, counting 
each of them separately would have created bias in the quantitative data.
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Appendix 3—Negative Binomial Regressions by Regions
a.  Africa

















Alternative - - - - - - -
Population 
(log)
0.561** 0.593* 0.551** 0.437 0.605** 0.821*** 0.757***
(0.276) (0.332) (0.239) (0.332) (0.296) (0.157) (0.210)
Delta year -0.0517 -0.0440 -0.0940** -0.0333 -0.0588 -0.157*** -0.0870**
(0.0355) (0.0479) (0.0382) (0.0532) (0.0461) (0.0362) (0.0395)
Constant -10.63** -11.11** -9.477*** -8.881* -11.13** -21.63*** -17.31***
(4.557) (5.292) (3.619) (5.140) (4.459) (3.757) (3.990)
Observations 465 427 465 489 489 457 489
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b. Asia















Alternative -1.151*** -1.109** -0.927* -1.076*** -0.414 -0.381 -1.105***
(0.360) (0.443) (0.483) (0.390) (0.618) (0.567) (0.376)
Population (log) 0.140 0.0629 0.149 0.0904 0.216 0.182 0.199
(0.139) (0.150) (0.143) (0.173) (0.136) (0.131) (0.157)
Delta year -0.103** -0.0845** -0.107*** -0.103*** -0.110*** -0.0791** -0.0940**
(0.0449) (0.0370) (0.0414) (0.0394) (0.0364) (0.0330) (0.0418)
Constant -1.700 -0.508 -1.680 -0.909 -3.212 0.207 -5.126*
(2.362) (2.479) (2.440) (2.928) (2.381) (1.990) (2.885)
Observations 159 151 159 159 159 159 159
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c.  Eastern Europe

















Alternative -1.780*** -2.798*** -1.606*** -2.322*** -2.656*** -2.368*** -1.567**
(0.662) (0.939) (0.500) (0.493) (0.715) (0.448) (0.619)
Population 
(log)
0.637*** 0.686*** 0.577*** 0.994*** 0.872*** 0.711*** 0.645***
(0.113) (0.131) (0.147) (0.353) (0.220) (0.104) (0.116)
Delta year -0.0459 -0.0421* -0.0497* -0.0430* -0.0343 -0.105*** -0.0323
(0.0300) (0.0237) (0.0267) (0.0245) (0.0254) (0.0294) (0.0231)
Constant -8.934*** -9.329*** -7.911*** -14.89*** -12.15*** -20.62*** -24.11
(1.971) (1.994) (2.571) (5.677) (3.064) (4.548) (22.72)
Observations 306 300 306 310 322 319 322
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d. Latin America















Alternative 15.70*** 14.43*** 15.04*** 15.68*** 15.65*** 15.66*** 14.17***
(1.091) (1.067) (1.084) (1.062) (1.081) (1.066) (1.160)
Population 
(log)
0.269* 0.130 0.255** 0.177 0.249* 0.239* 0.241*







-0.180*** -0.187*** -0.187*** -0.193***







-18.81*** -19.89*** -19.77*** -20.43***
(2.578) (2.899) (2.282) (2.548) (2.306) (2.268) (4.317)
Observations 313 280 313 313 313 313 313
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e.  Western

















Alternative -0.895*** -0.872*** -0.891*** -0.963*** -0.744*** -0.906*** -0.933***
(0.251) (0.285) (0.267) (0.263) (0.279) (0.252) (0.253)
Population 
(log)
0.757*** 0.794*** 0.768*** 0.683*** 0.826*** 0.743*** 0.756***
(0.176) (0.251) (0.180) (0.192) (0.190) (0.183) (0.178)
Delta year -0.105*** -0.107*** -0.0985*** -0.112*** -0.110*** -0.122*** -0.112***
(0.0224) (0.0209) (0.0216) (0.0221) (0.0210) (0.0278) (0.0221)
Constant -12.02*** -16.21* -11.72*** -9.461*** -13.17*** -13.59** -9.721
(3.372) (9.117) (3.263) (3.594) (3.462) (6.084) (8.871)
Observations 355 286 356 356 356 315 356
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Appendix 4—Negative Binomial Regressions by Time Frames
Time 1 (1997–2002)




















Alternative -1.131*** -1.114*** -1.000*** -0.651* -0.742** -0.897*** -0.326
(0.369) (0.353) (0.341) (0.338) (0.339) (0.307) (0.345)
Population 
(log)
0.388*** 0.346** 0.384*** 0.497*** 0.393*** 0.387*** 0.387***
(0.120) (0.149) (0.117) (0.147) (0.124) (0.127) (0.117)
Delta year -0.0496 -0.0525 -0.0412 -0.0622 -0.0749 -0.0569 -0.0685
(0.0856) (0.0893) (0.0852) (0.0967) (0.0985) (0.101) (0.0980)
Constant -7.415*** -5.703** -6.791*** -8.270*** -6.367*** -11.02*** -
10.48***
(2.315) (2.580) (2.108) (2.608) (2.185) (2.769) (2.590)
Observa-
tions
453 411 453 470 471 440 471
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Time 2 (2002–2007)

















Alternative -1.571*** -1.547*** -1.449*** -1.591*** -1.672*** -1.785*** -1.030***
(0.338) (0.330) (0.304) (0.322) (0.370) (0.363) (0.290)
Population 
(log)
0.655*** 0.664*** 0.685*** 0.828*** 0.679*** 0.621*** 0.662***
(0.115) (0.138) (0.136) (0.158) (0.120) (0.109) (0.120)
Delta year 0.121 0.101 0.108 0.0848 0.0989 0.0512 0.0783
(0.0987) (0.0933) (0.0946) (0.0876) (0.0882) (0.0829) (0.0837)
Constant -11.11*** -10.86*** -11.35*** -13.55*** -10.92*** -14.24*** -15.68***
(2.036) (2.183) (2.403) (2.636) (1.971) (2.508) (2.536)
Observations 504 454 504 509 514 493 514
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Time 3 (2007–2012)





















Alternative -1.488*** -1.343*** -1.413*** -1.541*** -1.562*** -1.574*** -1.286***
(0.510) (0.430) (0.454) (0.523) (0.546) (0.483) (0.454)
Population 
(log)
0.625*** 0.632*** 0.607*** 0.706*** 0.628*** 0.585*** 0.630***
(0.110) (0.125) (0.113) (0.134) (0.113) (0.108) (0.110)
Delta year -0.739*** -0.760*** -0.743*** -0.735*** -0.736*** -0.755*** -0.747***
(0.0884) (0.0940) (0.0909) (0.0840) (0.0834) (0.0820) (0.0861)
Constant -1.950 -1.662 -1.371 -3.396 -1.913 -6.305*** -4.688**
(2.159) (2.109) (2.109) (2.576) (2.132) (1.965) (1.893)
Observa-
tions
641 579 642 648 654 624 654
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Appendix 5321




2. How did you learn about the possibility of filing a communication to the 
Human Rights Committee (HRC)?
a. Legal education.
b. Knew someone who filed a communication.
c. Internet.
d. A lawyer informed me of the possibility.
e. NGO informed of the possibility.
f. Other ______________.
3. Do you think that the domestic courts were impartial in hearing your cli-
ent’s case before you chose to refer it to the HRC?
a. Yes.
b. No.
4. Did your client exhaust all possible domestic remedies before filing a 
communication to the HRC?
a. Yes.
b. No. Why? _________.
5. Did the state argue that the communication should not be heard by the 
HRC because domestic remedies had not been exhausted?
a. Yes.
b. No.
6. What was the primary reason for choosing to file a communication to the 
HRC?
321. This is the questionnaire for the representatives. The questionnaire for the appli-
cants themselves was similar, but for reasons of relevance omitted questions 13, 14, 15, 22, 
38, 40, 42.
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a. I/ the applicant believed that the state would implement the decision of 
the HRC.
b. I/ the applicant wanted to bring the human rights violation to interna-
tional attention.
c. Both a. and b.
d. Other: ___________.
7. Did you believe that the state would implement the decision of the HRC?
a. Yes.
b. No.
8. Do you believe that an alternative international human rights tribunal ex-
isted for the claim?
a. Yes.
b. No.
9. If you believed that alternative international tribunal existed, which tribu-
nal was that?
a. European Court of Human Rights.
b. Inter-American Commission/ Court on Human Rights.
c. African Commission/ Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
d. Other __________________.
10. If you believed that an alternative international tribunal existed, what was 
the primary reason for choosing the HRC for filing the communication?
a. I thought that it would be more efficient.
b. It was easier to file a communication.
c. It was cheaper to file a communication.
d. Other: __________.
11. How did you connect with the applicant?
12. Did you reach out to the applicant or did the applicant reach out to you?
13. Have you previously filed communications to the HRC?
a. Yes.
b. No.
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14. If you have filed communications before, what were the circumstances and 
against which state/ states were they filed? _____________.
15. Have you helped applicants with filing a communication without being of-
ficially listed as the representor in the case?




17. Did you have a chance to interact with other people or professionals who 




18. Please provide more information about your interactions with other appli-
cants: ______________.
19. Were you paid in order to help the applicant to file the communication?
a. Yes, the applicant paid.
b. Yes, someone else paid. Who? ____________
c. No, pro bono.
d. Other:___________.
20. How much money do you estimate that filing the communication cost? 
How much hours did it take you to work on the communication? ______
21. Was the applicant afraid of any harassment/ persecution by the state fol-
lowing the filing of the communication?
a. Yes.
b. No.
22. Were you, as the representative, afraid of any harassment/ persecution by 
the state following the filing of the communication?
a. Yes. In which way? _______.
b. No.
23. If you or the applicant were afraid of harassment/ persecution, why were 
you afraid? ___________.
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24. Did you or the applicant actually feel any harassment/ persecution by the 
state following the filing of the communication?
a. Yes: _____________.
b. No.
25. In which way were you/ the applicant harassed/ persecuted? ___________.





27. What were the main difficulties that you encountered with filing a com-
munication to the HRC? ____________.
28. At the time of filing the communication, were you aware of the implemen-
tation rate of the decisions of the HRC by the states?
a. Yes.
b. No.





30. What remedy, if at all, did the HRC indicate? _____________.
31. Do you think that the decision of the HRC specified detailed enough rem-
edies?
a. Yes.
b. No. Explain: ____________.
32. What did you think about the process before the HRC? ___________.
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34. Do you think that the process before the HRC was fair?
a. Yes.
b. No. Why? ________________.
35. Was the decision in your case implemented by the state?
a. Yes. How? _____________.
b. No.
c. Partially. How? ______________.
36. Did your client have to undergo an additional judicial/ administrative pro-
cedure in the national courts in order for the HRC decision to be imple-
mented by the state?
a. Yes. Which procedure? _____________.
b. No.
37. Do you think that the decision of the HRC had an impact beyond your spe-
cific case?
a. Yes. How? _________.
b. No. Why? __________.
38. On a scale of 1 to 5, how important was it for you that the state would im-
plement the communication? (1 not important, 5 important).
39. On a scale of 1 to 5, how important was it for the applicant that the state 
would implement the communication? (1 not important, 5 important).
40. On a scale of 1 to 5, how important was it for you that the national/ inter-
national public would be aware of the fact that you filed a communication 
against the state? (1 not important, 5 important).
41. On a scale of 1 to 5, how important was it for the applicant that the nation-
al/ international public would be aware of the fact that you filed a commu-
nication against the state? (1 not important, 5 important).
42. On a scale of 1 to 5, how important was it for you that the national/ inter-
national public would be aware of the decision of the HRC in the commu-
nication? (1 not important, 5 important).
43. On a scale of 1 to 5, how important was it for the applicant that the nation-
al/ international public would be aware of the decision of the HRC in the 
communication? (1 not important, 5 important).
44. Did you encourage/ are you planning to encourage other people to file 
communications to the HRC and why?
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a. Yes: ____________.
b. No: ____________.
45. What can be improved in order to make the process more accessible? 
______________.




47. On a scale of 1 to 5, how satisfied are you from the process before the 
HRC? (1 not satisfied, 5 satisfied).
